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I. Introduction 
There is ample evidence from economics and psychology that cognitive ability is a 
powerful predictor of economic and social outcomes.1  It is intuitively obvious that cognition is 
essential in processing information, learning, and in decision making.2  It is also intuitively 
obvious that other traits besides raw problem-solving ability matter for success in life.  The 
effects of personality traits, motivation, health, strength, and beauty on socioeconomic outcomes 
have recently been studied by economists.3  
 The power of traits other than cognitive ability for success in life is vividly 
demonstrated by the Perry Preschool study.  This experimental intervention enriched the early 
family environments of disadvantaged children with subnormal intelligence quotients (IQs). 
Both treatments and controls were followed into their 40s.  As demonstrated in Figure 1, by age 
ten, treatment group mean IQs were the same as control group mean IQs.  Yet on a variety of 
measures of socioeconomic achievement, over their life cycles, the treatment group was far more 
successful than the control group.4  Something besides IQ was changed by the intervention.  
Heckman et al. (2007) show that it is the personality and motivation of the participants.  This 
paper examines the relevance of personality to economics and the relevance of economics to 
personality psychology. 
Both economists and psychologists estimate preference parameters such as time 
preference, risk aversion, altruism, and, more recently, social preferences, to explain the 
behaviors of individuals.  The predictive power of these preference parameters, their origins and 
the stability of these parameters over the lifecycle, are less well understood and are actively 
being studied. 
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Economists are now beginning to use the personality inventories developed by 
psychologists.  This paper examines these measurement systems and their relationship with the 
preference parameters of economists.  There is danger in economists taking the labels assigned to 
psychologists’ personality scores literally and misinterpreting what they actually measure.  We 
examine the concepts captured by the psychological measurements and the stability of the 
measurements across situations in which they are measured.   
We eschew the term “noncognitive” to describe personality traits even though many 
recent papers in economics use this term in this way. In popular usage, and in our own prior 
work, “noncognitive” is often juxtaposed with “cognitive”.  This contrast has intuitive appeal 
because of contrast between cognitive ability and traits other than cognitive ability.  However, a 
contrast between “cognitive” and “noncognitive” traits creates the potential for much confusion 
because few aspects of human behavior are devoid of cognition.  Many aspects of personality are 
influenced by cognitive processes.  We show that measurements of cognitive ability are affected 
by personality factors. 
We focus our analysis on personality traits, defined as patterns of thought, feelings, and 
behavior. We do not discuss in depth motivation, values, interests, and attitudes which give rise 
to personality traits. Thus, we focus our discussion on individual differences in how people 
actually think, feel, and act, not on how people want to think, feel, and act. This omission bounds 
the scope of our work and focuses attention on traits that have been measured. We refer the 
interested reader to McAdams (2006), Roberts et al. (2006), and McAdams and Pals (2007) for 
an overview of the literature in psychology on aspects of personality that we neglect.5,6 
Our focus is pragmatic.  Personality psychologists have developed measurement systems 
for personality traits which economists have begun to use.  Most prominent is the “Big Five” 
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personality inventory.  There is value in understanding this system and related systems before 
tackling the deeper question of the origins of the traits that are measured by them. 
The lack of familiarity of economists with these personality measures is one reason for 
their omission from most economic studies.  Another reason is that many economists have yet to 
be convinced of their predictive validity, stability or their causal status, believing instead that 
behavior is entirely situationally determined.  Most data on personality are observational and not 
experimental.  Personality traits may, therefore, reflect, rather than cause, the outcomes that they 
are alleged to predict.  Large-scale studies are necessarily limited in the array of personality 
measures that they include. Without evidence that there is value in knowing which personality 
traits are most important in predicting outcomes, there is little incentive to include sufficiently 
broad and nuanced personality measures in empirical studies.   
Most economists are unaware of the evidence that certain personality traits are more 
malleable than cognitive ability over the life cycle and are more sensitive to investment by 
parents and to other sources of environmental influences at later ages than are cognitive traits.  
Social policy designed to remediate deficits in achievement can be effective by operating outside 
of purely cognitive channels.  
This paper shows that it is possible to conceptualize and measure personality traits and 
that both cognitive ability and personality traits predict a variety of social and economic 
outcomes.  We study the degree to which traits are stable over situations and over the life cycle.  
We examine the claim that behavior is purely situation-specific and show evidence against it.  
Specifically, in this paper we address the following questions. 
1. Is It Conceptually Possible to Separate Cognitive Ability from Personality Traits?  
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Many aspects of personality are a consequence of cognition, and cognition depends on 
personality.  Nonetheless, one can separate those two aspects of human differences. 
2.  Is It Possible to Empirically Distinguish Cognitive from Personality Traits? 
Measures of economic preferences are influenced by numeracy and intelligence.  IQ test 
scores are determined not only by intelligence, but also by factors such as motivation and 
anxiety.  Moreover, over the life cycle, the development of cognitive ability is influenced by 
personality traits such as curiosity, ambition, and perseverance. 
3. What Are the Main Measurement Systems in Psychology for Intelligence and 
Personality, and How Are They Validated?   
Most personality psychologists rely on paper-and-pencil self report questionnaires.  Other 
psychologists and many economists measure conventional economic preference parameters, such 
as time preference and risk aversion.  We summarize both types of studies.  There is a gap in the 
literature in psychology: it does not systematically relate the two types of measurement systems.   
Psychologists seeking to create valid personality questionnaires balance multiple 
concerns. One objective is to create questionnaires with construct-related validity defined as 
constructs with an internal factor structure that is consistent across time, gender, ethnicity, and 
culture. A distinct concern is creation of survey instruments with predictive validity.  With 
notable exceptions, contemporary personality psychologists seeking direct measures of 
personality traits privilege construct validity over predictive validity in their choice of measures. 
4. What is the Evidence on the Predictive Power of Cognitive and Personality Traits? 
We summarize evidence that both cognitive ability and personality traits predict 
important outcomes, including schooling, wages, crime, teenage pregnancy, and longevity.  For 
many outcomes, certain personality traits (that is, traits associated with Big Five 
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Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability) are more predictive than others (that is, traits 
associated with Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and Extraversion). Tasks in social and 
economic life vary in terms of the weight placed on the cognitive and personality traits required 
to predict outcomes.  The relative importance of a trait varies by the task studied.  Cognitive 
traits are predictive of performance in a greater variety of tasks.  Personality traits are important 
in explaining performance in specific tasks, although different personality traits are predictive in 
different tasks.  The classical model of factor analysis, joined with the principle of comparative 
advantage, helps to organize the evidence in economics and psychology.   
5. How Stable Are Personality Traits Across Situations and Across The Life Cycle?  Are 
They More Sensitive than Cognitive Traits to Investment and Intervention?7 
We present evidence that both cognitive and personality traits evolve over the lifecycle—
but to different degrees and at different stages of the life cycle.  Cognitive processing speed, for 
example, tends to rise sharply during childhood, peak in late adolescence, and then slowly 
decline. In contrast, some personality traits, such as conscientiousness, increase monotonically 
from childhood to late adulthood.  Rank-order stability for many personality measures peaks 
between the ages of 50 to 70, whereas IQ reaches these same levels of stability by middle 
childhood.  We also examine the recent evidence on the situational specificity of personality 
traits.  Traits are sufficiently stable across situations to support the claim that traits exist, 
although their manifestation depends on context and the traits themselves evolve over the life 
cycle.  Recent models of parental and environmental investment in children explain the evolution 
of these traits.  We develop models in which traits are allocated differentially across tasks and 
activities.  Persons may manifest different levels of traits in different tasks and activities. 
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6. Do the Findings from Psychology Suggest That Conventional Economic Theory Should 
Be Enriched?  Can Conventional Models of Preferences in Economics Explain the Body of 
Evidence from Personality Psychology? Does Personality Psychology Merely Recast Well-
Known Preference Parameters into Psychological Jargon, or is There Something New for 
Economists to Learn? 
Conventional economic theory is sufficiently elastic to accommodate many findings of 
psychology.  However, our analysis suggests that certain traditional concepts used in economics 
should be modified and certain emphases redirected.  Some findings from psychology cannot be 
rationalized by standard economic models and could fruitfully be incorporated into economic 
analysis.  Much work remains to be done in synthesizing a body of empirical knowledge in 
personality psychology into economics. 
The evidence from personality psychology suggests a more radical reformulation of 
classical choice theory than is currently envisioned in behavioral economics which tinkers with 
conventional specifications of preferences.  Cognitive ability and personality traits impose 
constraints on agent choice behavior. More fundamentally, conventional economic preference 
parameters can be interpreted as consequences of these constraints.  For example, high rates of 
measured time preference may be produced by the inability of agents to delay gratification, 
interpreted as a constraint, or by the inability of agents to imagine the future.  We develop a 
framework that introduces psychological variables as constraints into conventional economic 
choice models. 
The paper proceeds in the following way.  Section II defines cognitive ability and 
personality traits and describes how these concepts are measured.   Section III considers 
methodological issues that arise in interpreting the measurements.  Section IV presents evidence 
 7
by psychologists and economists on basic economic parameters.  Section V examines the 
predictive power of the traits studied by personality psychologists who, in general, are a distinct 
body of scholars from the psychologists measuring economics preference parameters.  Section 
VI examines the evidence on the evolution of preference parameters and personality traits over 
the life cycle.  We summarize recent work in psychology that demonstrates stability in 
preference parameters across diverse settings.  Section VII presents a framework for interpreting 
personality and economic parameters.  Recent work in behavioral economics and psychology 
that seeks to integrate economics and psychology focuses almost exclusively on preference 
parameters. In contrast, we present a broader framework that includes constraints, skill 
acquisition, learning as well as conventional preference parameters.  Section VIII concludes by 
summarizing the paper and suggesting an agenda for future research. 
II. Definitions And A Basic Framework Of Measurement And Interpretation 
We distinguish between cognitive ability on the one hand and personality traits on the 
other. We do not mean to imply that personality traits are devoid of any elements of cognitive 
processing, or vice versa. Schulkin (2007) reviews evidence that cortical structures associated 
with cognition and higher level functions play an active role in regulating motivation, a function 
previously thought to be the exclusive domain of sub-cortical structures8. Conversely, Phelps 
(2006) shows that emotions associated with personality traits are involved in learning, attention, 
and other aspects of cognition.  A distinction between cognitive ability and personality traits 
begs for a specific definition of cognitive ability.  Before defining these concepts, we first review 
the rudiments of factor analysis, which is the conceptual framework that underlies much of the 
literature in psychology, and is a basis for unifying economics with that field.  We use the factor 
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model as an organizing device throughout this paper, even in our definitions of cognitive and 
personality traits. 
A. Factor Analysis 
Central to psychology and recent empirical work at the intersection of economics and 
psychology is the concept of factors.  Let Ti,j denote performance on task j for person i.  There 
are J  tasks.  The task could be a test, or the production of tangible outputs (for example, 
assembling a rifle or managing a store).  Individuals perform many tasks.  Output on tasks is 
generated in part by latent “traits” or factors.  Factors or psychological traits for individual i are 
represented in a vector fi, i=1,…, I, where I is the number of individuals.  The vector has L 
components so ,1 ,( ,..., )i i i Lf f f= .  The traits may include cognitive and personality components.  
Let Ui,j be other determinants of productivity in task j for person i.  We discuss these 
determinants in this paper. 
The task performance function for person i on task j can be expressed as 
(1)     Ti,j=hj(fi,Ui,j), i=1,…,I,  j=1,…,J. 
Different factors are more or less important in different tasks.  For example, a purely cognitive 
task would place no weight on the personality components in vector fi in generating task output.9   
Linear factor models are widely used in psychology.  These models write  
(2)    Ti,j=µj+λjfi+Ui,j, i=1,…,I,  j=1,…,J, 
where jµ is the mean of the jth task and jλ  is a vector of factor loadings.  The number of 
components in fi, L, has to be small relative to J (L<<J) if the factor model is to have empirical 
content.  A purely cognitive task would be associated with zero values of the components of 
vector λj on elements of fi that are associated with personality traits.  Factor models (1) and (2) 
capture the notion that: (a) latent traits fi generate a variety of outcomes, (b) task outputs are 
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imperfect measures of the traits (fi), and (c) that tasks other than tests may also proxy the 
underlying traits.  Latent traits generate both test scores and behaviors.  Notice that tasks may 
depend on vector fi and outcomes across tasks may be correlated even if the components of fi are 
not.  A correlation can arise because tasks depend on the same vector of traits.10 
B. Cognitive Ability 
Intelligence (or cognitive ability) has been defined by an official taskforce of the 
American Psychological Association as the “ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt 
effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of 
reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought” (Neisser et al. 1996, p. 77).  The term “IQ” 
is often used synonymously with intelligence but in fact refers specifically to scores on 
intelligence tests.11  In this paper, we present evidence on how measurements of cognitive ability 
are affected by the environment, including incentives and parental investment.   
Scores on different tests of cognitive ability tend to be highly intercorrelated, often with 
half or more of the variance of diverse tests accounted for by a single general factor labeled “g” 
and more specific mental abilities loading on other factors (Jensen 1998; Lubinski 2004; 
Spearman 1904, 1927).  Both IQ and achievement tests proxy latent factors fi, but to varying 
degrees and with different mediating variables. 
Most psychologists agree that cognitive abilities are organized hierarchically with “g” as 
the highest-order factor (Spearman 1904). In this context, the order of a factor indicates its 
generality in explaining a variety of tests of cognitive ability with different emphases (for 
example, verbal ability, numeracy, coding speed, and other tasks).  A first-order factor is 
predictive in all tasks, j=1,..., J in equation (1).  A lower order factor is predictive in only some 
tasks.  There is less agreement about the number and identity of lower-order factors.12  Cattell 
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(1971; 1987) contrasts two second-order factors:  fluid intelligence (the ability to solve novel 
problems) and crystallized intelligence (knowledge and developed skills).13  The relative 
weighting of fluid versus crystallized intelligence varies among tests according to the degree to 
which prior experience is crucial to performance.  These factors operate in addition to the first-
order factor, g. Achievement tests, like the Armed Forces Qualifying Test used by economists 
and psychologists alike, are heavily weighted towards crystallized intelligence, whereas tests like 
the Raven Progressive Matrices (1962) are heavily weighted towards fluid intelligence.14 Carroll 
(1993) and Horn and McArdle (2007) summarize the large body of evidence against the claim 
that a single factor “g” is sufficient to explain the correlation structure of achievement and 
intelligence tests. 15 
C. Personality Traits 
A distinction between personality and cognition is not easy to make. Consider, for 
example, so-called “quasi-cognitive” traits (Kyllonen, Walters, and Kaufman 2005). These 
include creativity (Csikszentmihalyi 1996), emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey 1997), 
cognitive style (Stanovich 1999; Perkins and Tishman 2001), typical intellectual engagement 
(Ackerman and Heggestad 1997), and practical intelligence (Sternberg 2000).  
The problem of conceptually distinguishing cognitive traits from personality traits is 
demonstrated in an analysis of executive function which is variously described as a cognitive 
function or a function regulating emotions and decision, depending on the scholar.16  Executive 
function is not a trait but, rather, a collection of behaviors thought to be mediated by the 
prefrontal cortex.  Components of executive function include behavioral inhibition, working 
memory, attention, and other so-called “top-down” mental processes whose function is to 
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orchestrate lower-level processes.  These components are so distinct that it is odd that 
psychologists have bundled them into one category. 
Ardila, Pineda, and Rosselli (2000), Welsh, Pennington, and Grossier (1991), and Schuck 
and Crinella (2005) find that many measures of executive function do not correlate reliably with 
IQ. Supporting this claim are case studies of lesion patients who suffer marked deficits in 
executive function, especially self-regulation, the ability to socialize and plan, but who retain the 
ability to reason (Damasio 1994).  However, measures of one aspect of execution function – 
working memory capacity in particular – correlate very highly with measures of fluid 
intelligence (Heitz, Unsworth, and Engle 2005). In fact, the 2007 APA Dictionary defines 
executive function as “higher level cognitive processes that organize and order behavior, 
including logic and reasoning, abstract thinking, problem solving, planning and carrying out and 
terminating  goal-directed behavior.”  Currently there is a lively debate among psychologists as 
to the precise relationship among working memory, other aspects of executive function, and 
intelligence (see Blair 2006, and ensuing commentary). 
This paper focuses on personality traits that are more easily distinguished from cognitive 
ability.  They are distinguished from intelligence, defined as the ability to solve abstract 
problems.  Most measures of personality are only weakly correlated with IQ (Webb 1915; 
McCrae and Costa 1994; Stankov 2005; Ackerman and Heggestad 1997).  There are, however, a 
small number of exceptions. Most notably, IQ is moderately associated with the Big Five factor 
called openness to experience, with the trait of sensation seeking, and with measures of time 
preference.  The reported correlations are of the order r = .3 or lower.  We note in Section III that 
performance on IQ tests is affected by personality variables.  Even if there is such a thing as pure 
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cognition or pure personality, measurements are affected by a variety of factors besides purely 
cognitive ones. 
D. Operationalizing the Concepts 
Intelligence tests are routinely used in a variety of settings including business, education, 
civil service, and the military.17  Testers attempt to use a test score (one of the Ti,j in equation (1) 
interpreting test scores as tasks) to measure a factor (a component of fi).  The working hypothesis 
in the intelligence testing business is that specific tests measure only a single component of fi, 
and that tests with different “content domains” measure different components.  We first discuss 
the origins of the measurement systems for intelligence and we then discuss their validity.18 
IQ Tests 
Modern intelligence tests have been used for just over a century, beginning with the 
decision of a Parisian minister of public instruction to identify retarded pupils in need of 
specialized education programs. Alfred Binet created the first IQ test.19 Other pioneers in 
intelligence testing include James McKeen Cattell (1890) and Francis Galton (1883), both of 
whom developed tests of basic cognitive functions (for example, discriminating between objects 
of different weights).  These early tests were eventually rejected in favor of tests that attempt to 
tap higher mental processes. Terman (1916) adapted Binet’s IQ test for use with American 
populations. Known as the Stanford-Binet IQ test, Terman’s adaptation was, like the original 
French test, used primarily to predict academic performance. Stanford-Binet test scores were 
presented as ratios of mental age to chronological age multiplied by 100 to eliminate decimal 
points.  IQ scores centered at 100 as the average are now conventional for most intelligence tests. 
Wechsler (1939) noted two major limitations of the Stanford-Binet test:  (1) it was overly 
reliant on verbal skills and, therefore, dependent upon formal education, and (2) the ratio of 
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mental to chronological age was inappropriate for adults (Boake 2002).  Wechsler created a new 
intelligence test battery divided into verbal (similarities, for example) and performance subtests 
(block design, matrix reasoning, for example). He also replaced the ratio IQ score with deviation 
scores that had the same normal distribution at each age. This test, the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS) – and, later, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) – 
produces two different IQ subscores, verbal IQ and performance IQ, which sum to a full-scale IQ 
score. The WAIS and the WISC have for the past several decades been by far the most 
commonly used IQ tests.  
Similar to Wechsler’s Matrix Reasoning subtest, the Raven Progressive Matrices test is a 
so-called “culture-free” IQ test because it does not depend heavily on verbal skills or other 
knowledge explicitly taught during formal education.  Each matrix test item presents a pattern of 
abstract figures.20  The test taker must choose the missing part.21  If subjects have not had 
exposure to such visual puzzles, the Raven test is an almost pure measure of fluid intelligence. 
However, the assumption that subjects are unfamiliar with such puzzles is not typically tested. It 
is likely that children from more educated families or from more developed countries have more 
exposure to such abstract puzzles (Blair 2006).  To varying degrees, IQ tests reflect fluid 
intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and motivation.  We summarize the evidence on this point 
in section III. 
E. Personality Tests 
There is a parallel tradition in psychology of measuring personality using a variety of 
tests and self-reports of observers about traits.  It has different origins.  Personality tests were 
initially designed to describe individual differences.  IQ tests were designed to predict 
performance on specific tasks.  As the field of personality psychology evolved, some personality 
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psychologists began to focus on prediction although description remains the main point of 
interest. 
Dominant theories of personality assume a hierarchical structure analogous to that found 
for intelligence.  However, despite early efforts to identify a g for personality (for example, 
Webb 1915), even the most parsimonious personality models incorporate more than one factor. 
The most widely accepted taxonomy of personality traits is the Big Five or five-factor model.22  
The factors are obtained from conventional factor analysis using a version of (2) where the 
“tasks” are measures of different domains of personality based on observer reports or self 
reports.   
This model originated in Allport and Odbert’s (1936) lexical hypothesis, which posits 
that the most important individual differences are encoded in language. Allport and Odbert 
combed English dictionaries and found 17,953 personality-describing words, which were later 
reduced to 4,504 personality-describing adjectives. Subsequently, several different psychologists 
working independently and on different samples concluded that personality traits can be 
organized into five superordinate dimensions.  These five factors have been known as the Big 
Five since Goldberg (1971).   
The Big Five factors are Openness to Experience (also called Intellect or Culture), 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (also called Emotional 
Stability).  A convenient acronym for these factors is “OCEAN”.  These factors represent 
personality at the broadest level of abstraction. Each factor summarizes a large number of 
distinct, more specific, personality characteristics. John (1990) and Costa and McCrae (1992a) 
present evidence that most of the variables used to assess personality in academic research in the 
field of personality psychology can be mapped into one or more of the dimensions of the Big 
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Five. They argue that the Big Five may be thought of as the longitude and latitude of personality, 
by which all more narrowly defined traits (often called “facets”) may be categorized (Costa and 
McCrae, 1992a). Table 1 presents these factors and summarizes the 30 lower-level facets (six 
facets for each of five factors) identified in the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R, 
Costa and McCrae, 1992b), shorthand for Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness to experience—
Personality Inventory—Revised.  It is the most widely-used Big Five questionnaire. Since 1996, 
free public-domain measures of Big Five factors and facets derived from the International 
Personality Item Pool have been made available.23 
The Big Five model is not without its critics. For example, Eysenck (1991) offers a 
model with just three factors (that is, Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Psychoticism). Cloninger 
(1987) and Tellegen (1985) offer different three-factor models.  Figure 2 shows the 
commonalities across competing taxonomies and also areas of divergence.  Despite solid 
evidence that five factors can be extracted from most if not all personality inventories in English 
and other languages, there is nothing sacred about the five-factor representation. For example, 
Mershon and Gorsuch (1988) show that solutions with more factors substantially increase the 
prediction of such outcomes as job performance, income, and change in psychiatric status.  More 
parsimonious models in which the five factors are reduced further to two “metatraits” have also 
been suggested (Digman 1997).  
The most stinging criticism of the five-factor model is that it is atheoretical. The finding 
that descriptions of behavior as measured by tests, self-reports, and reports of observers cluster 
reliably into five groups has not so far been explained by a basic theory.  Research is underway 
on determining the neural substrates of the Big Five (see Canli 2006).  The Big Five model is 
derived from a factor analysis among test scores and is not derived from predictive criteria in 
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performance on real-world tasks.  Block (1995) questions not only the five-factor model itself 
but, more generally, the utility of factor analysis as a tool for understanding the true structure of 
personality. Anyone familiar with factor analysis knows that determining a particular factor 
representation often entails some amount of subjective judgment.  However, the very same 
complaints apply to the atheoretical, factor-analytic basis for the extraction of “g” and lower 
order factors from tests of cognition (see Cudek and McCallum, 2007).We discuss this issue 
further in Section III.  
The five-factor model is largely silent on an important class of individual differences that 
do not receive much attention in the recent psychology literature: motivation.  The omission of 
motivation (that is, what people value or desire) from measures of Big Five traits is not complete, 
however.  The NEO-PI-R, for example, includes as a facet “achievement striving”.  Individual 
differences in motivation are more prominent in older (now rarely used) measures of personality. 
The starting point for Jackson’s Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson 1974), for example, 
was Murray’s (1938) theory of basic human drives. Included in the PRF are scales for (need for) 
play, order, autonomy, achievement, affiliation, social recognition, and safety. The Schwartz 
Values Survey (Schwartz, 1992) is another self-report measure of motivation and yields scores 
on ten different motivations including power, achievement, benevolence, and conformity.  Some 
motivation theorists believe that one’s deepest desires are unconscious and, therefore, may 
dispute the practice of measuring motivation using self-report questionnaires (see McClelland et 
al, 1989). For a brief review of this debate and an overview of how motivation and personality 
trait measures differ, see Roberts et al. (2006). 
A practical problem facing the analyst who wishes to measure personality is the 
multiplicity of personality questionnaires. The proliferation of personality measures reflects, in 
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part, the more heterogeneous nature of personality in comparison to cognitive ability, although, 
as we have seen, various types of cognitive ability have been established in the literature.24 The 
panoply of measures and constructs also points to the relatively recent and incomplete 
convergence of personality psychologists on the Big Five model, as well as the lack of consensus 
among researchers about identifying and organizing lower-order facets of the Big Five factors 
(see DeYoung 2007 and Hofstee, de Raad, and Goldberg 1992). For example, some theorists 
argue that impulsivity is a facet of Neuroticism (Costa and McCrae, 1992b), others claim that it 
is a facet of Conscientiousness (Roberts et al. 2005a), and still others suggest that it is a blend of 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and perhaps Neuroticism (Revelle 1997).  Figure 2 shows in 
italics facets whose classification is in debate. Another reason for the proliferation of measures is 
the methodology of verifying tests − a point we develop in Section III.   
F. Measures of Temperament 
The question of how to measure personality in adults leads naturally to a consideration of 
personality traits in childhood. Temperament is the term used by developmental psychologists to 
describe the behavioral tendencies of infants and children.25  Because individual differences in 
temperament emerge so early in life, these traits have traditionally been assumed to be biological 
(as opposed to environmental) in origin.26 However, findings in behavioral genetics suggest that, 
like adult personality, temperament is only partly heritable, and as discussed in Section VI, both 
adult and child measured traits are affected by the environment. 
 Temperament is studied primarily by child and developmental psychologists, while 
personality is studied by adult personality psychologists. The past decade has seen some 
convergence of these two research traditions, however, and there is evidence that temperamental 
differences observed during the preschool years to a limited extent anticipate adult personality 
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and interpersonal functioning decades later (for example, Caspi 2000; Newman et al. 1997; 
Shiner and Caspi 2003).  
Historically, many temperament researchers examined specific lower-order traits rather 
than broader, higher-level factors that characterize studies of adult intelligence and personality.27 
Shiner (1998) suggests that “there is therefore a great need to bring order to this vast array of 
studies of single lower level traits.” Recently, taxonomies of temperament have been proposed 
that group lower-order traits into higher-order dimensions; several of these taxonomies resemble 
the Big Five (for example, John et al., 1994; Putnam, Ellis, and Rothbart 2001; Rothbart, Ahadi, 
and Evans 2000; Shiner and Caspi 2003). However, compared to adults, there seem to be fewer 
ways that young children can differ from one another. Child psychologists often refer to the 
“elaboration” or “differentiation” of childhood temperament into the full flower of complex, 
adult personality.  The lack of direct correspondence between measures of temperament and 
measures of adult personality presents a challenge to researchers interested in documenting 
changes in personality over the full life cycle.  Developing the required measures is an active 
area of research. 
III. Measurement And Methodological Issues 
In studies gauging the importance of cognitive and personality traits on outcomes, 
economists are beginning to use measures developed by psychologists.28  We have discussed 
these measures in general terms in the preceding section and will discuss specific measurements 
in Sections IV and V.  Before discussing the details of specific measurement schemes, it is useful 
to understand limitations of currently used measurement systems at an abstract level.  
There are two general types of measurement schemes: (a) those that seek to measure or 
elicit conventional economic preference parameters, and (b) those that measure personality with 
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self-reports or observer reports.  Personality psychologists focus primarily on the latter.  
Economists and the psychologists working at the interface of economics and psychology use the 
former.  Given our focus in this paper on personality psychology, in this section we devote the 
lion’s share of attention to the second approach, which is the source of most of the findings in 
personality psychology.  However, many points we make apply to both approaches. 
Personality psychologists marshal three types of evidence to establish the validity of their 
tests: content-related, construct-related, and criterion-related evidence (AERA, APA, 1999).  
Content-related evidence demonstrates that a given measure adequately represents the construct 
being measured.  Qualitative judgments about content-related validity are made by experts in the 
subject.  In recent years, psychologists have devoted more energy to establishing quantitative 
construct-related evidence for a measure.  Test items for a construct that are highly correlated 
form a cluster.  If items are highly correlated within a cluster but weakly correlated with items 
across other clusters, the set of tests are said to have both “convergent and discriminant validity,” 
with the “convergent” referring to the intercorrelations within a cluster and the “discriminant” 
referring to lack of correlation across clusters.  This method relies on factor analysis.29  A third 
approach is based on criterion-related evidence.  As the term is used by psychologists, 
“predictive validity” is a type of criterion validity – a measure of association between tests or 
self-reports and future outcomes.  Evidence for predictive validity is inherently more attractive to 
economists than construct validity but has its own problems.  Neither approach assesses the 
causal validity of the underlying factors.  Because of problems with measurement error in tests, 
an approach based on predictive validity almost certainly leads to a proliferation of measures that 
are proxies for a lower-dimensional set of latent variables, “constructs” or factors in the 
psychology literature. 
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A. The Factor Model for Test Scores 
To understand the approaches to the validation of intelligence and personality measures 
in psychology and their recent applications and extensions in economics, it is helpful to build on 
the simple factor model presented in Section II.  There we defined a set of J tasks which depend 
on a vector fi of unspecified dimension.  These latent factors generate performance on a variety 
of tasks. 
A task can be a test or performance on a real world task.  We stress that measurements on 
either type of task are generated by the fi.  Some components of fi may be of no value in some 
tasks, so the derivatives of (1) with respect to those components for those task functions are 
identically zero. 
Personality psychologists largely focus on observer and self reports.  The measurements 
are designed to capture a particular latent factor.  The concept of “discriminant validity” of a 
battery of tests captures the notion that the particular battery measures a component of fi, for 
example, fi,l, and not other components.  Many measurements may be taken on fi,l.  We introduce 
a notation to distinguish the subset of tasks composed of tests and observer reports from other 
tasks.  While the measurements are really just a type of task, it is fruitful to separate them out in 
order to survey the literature in psychology which assigns a special status to tests, self-reports, 
and observer reports of latent traits.  
Let ,
n
i lM  be the n
th measurement (by test or observer report) on trait l for person i.  Using 
a linear factor representation, the nth measurement of factor l for person I is assumed to be 
representable as  
(3)    , , ,
,
1,..., , 1,..., , 1,..., .
n n n n
i l l l i l i l
l
M f
n N i I l L
µ λ ε= + +
= = =  
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The factor fi,l is assumed to be statistically independent of the measurement errors, 
, , 1,...,
n
i l ln Nε = .  Different factors are assumed to be independent (fl independent of 'lf  for l ≠ l′ ).  
The measurement errors (or “uniquenesses”) are assumed to be mutually independent within and 
across constructs. 
In fact, measurement ,
n
l iM  may depend on other components of fi, so that the 
measurement captures a composite of latent traits.  Thus in general we may have 
(4)   , , , 1,...,
n n n n
i l l i i l lM f n Nµ λ ε= + + = , 
where nλ  is a vector with possibly as many as L nonzero components.  The ,ni lε  are assumed to 
be independent of fi and mutually independent within and across constructs ( l  and l′  are two 
constructs).  The test has discriminant validity if nlλ  is the only nonzero component of fi.  The 
n
lµ  and nlλ  can depend on measured characteristics of the agent, Qi.30 
B. The Psychometric Approach and Its Limits 
The standard approach to defining constructs in personality psychology is based on factor 
analysis.  It takes a set of measurements (including observer and self reports) that are designed to 
capture a construct arrived at through intuitive considerations and conventions, and measures 
within-cluster and across-cluster correlations of the measurements to isolate latent factors 
, , 1,...,l if l L=  or their distributions.  The measurements and clusters of tests are selected on 
intuitive grounds or a priori grounds, and not on the basis of any predictive validity in terms of 
real world outcomes (for example, success in college, performance on the job, earnings).  This 
process gave rise to the taxonomy of traits that became the Big Five.  Because of the arbitrary 
basis of these taxonomies, there is some controversy in psychology about competing construct 
systems.  In practice, as we document below, the requirement of independence of the latent 
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factors across constructs (lack of correlation of tests across clusters) is not easily satisfied.31  This 
fuels controversy among competing taxonomies. 
Conventional psychometric validity of a collection of item or test scores for different 
constructs thus has three aspects.  (a) A factor fl is assumed to account for the intercorrelations 
among the items or tests within a construct l.  (b) Item-specific and random error variance are 
low (intercorrelations among items are high within a cluster).32  (c) Factor fl for construct l is 
independent of factor lf ′  for construct l′ .  Criteria (a) and (b) are required for “convergent 
validity.”  Criterion (c) is “discriminant validity.”   
An alternative approach to constructing measurement systems is based on the predictive 
power of the tests for real world outcomes, that is, on behaviors measured outside of the exam 
room or observer system.  The Hogan Personality Inventory33, the California Personality 
Inventory, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory were all developed with the 
specific purpose of predicting real-world outcomes. Decisions to retain or drop items during the 
development of these inventories were based, at least in part, upon the ability of items to predict 
such outcomes. This approach has an appealing concreteness about it.  Instead of relying on 
abstract a priori notions about domains of personality and subjectively defined latent factors 
generated from test scores and self and observer personality assessments, it anchors 
measurements in tangible, real-world outcomes and constructs explicit tests with predictive 
power.  Yet this approach has major problems.   
First, all measurements of factor ,i lf  can claim incremental predictive validity as long as 
each measurement is subject to error ( ), 0ni lε ≠ .  Proxies for ,i lf  can appear to be separate 
determinants (or “causes”) instead of surrogates for an underlying one-dimensional construct or 
factor.  Thus suppose that model (4) is correct and that a set of measurements display both 
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convergent and discriminant validity.  As long as there are measurement errors for construct l, 
there is no limit to the number of proxies for ,i lf  that will show up as statistically significant 
predictors of an outcome.  This is a standard result in the econometrics of measurement error.  
We develop this point further in Web Appendix A.34 
A second problem is reverse causality.  This is especially problematic when interpreting 
correlations between personality measurements and outcomes.  Outcomes may influence the 
personality measures as well as the other way around.  For example, self-esteem might increase 
income, and income might increase self-esteem. Measuring personality prior to measuring 
predicted outcomes does not necessarily obviate this problem. For example, the anticipation of a 
future pay raise may increase present self-esteem. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) and 
Urzua (2007) demonstrate the importance of correcting for reverse causality in interpreting the 
effects of personality tests on a variety of socioeconomic outcomes.  Application of econometric 
techniques for determining the causal effects of factors on outcomes makes a distinctive 
contribution to psychology.  These methods are briefly surveyed in Web Appendix A. 
Many psychologists focus on prediction, not causality, out of ignorance of more 
sophisticated econometric tools.  Establishing predictive validity will often be enough to achieve 
the goal of making good placement decisions.  However, for policy analysis, including analyses 
of new programs designed to augment the skills of the disadvantaged, causal models are 
needed.35 
The papers of Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), Urzua (2007), and Cunha and 
Heckman (2008), are frameworks for circumventing the problems that arise in using predictive 
validity alone to define and measure personality constructs.36  These frameworks recognize the 
problem of measurement error in the proxies for constructs.  Constructs are created on the basis 
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of how well latent factors predict outcomes.  They develop a framework for testing discriminant 
validity because they allow the factors across different clusters of constructs to be correlated, and 
can test for correlations across the factors. 
They use an extension of factor analysis to represent proxies of low dimensional factors.  
They test for the number of latent factors required to fit the data and rationalize the proxies.37  
Generalizing the analysis of Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004), they allow for lifetime 
experiences and investments to determine in part the coefficients of the factor model and to 
affect the factor itself.  They correct estimates of latent factors on outcomes for the effects of 
spurious feedback, and separate proxies from factors.  The factors are estimated to change over 
the life cycle as a consequence of experience and investment. 
Measurements of latent factors may be corrupted by “faking.”  There are at least two 
types of false responses: those arising from impression management and those arising from self-
deception (Paulhus, 1984). For example, individuals who know that their responses on a 
personality questionnaire will be used to make hiring decisions may deliberately exaggerate their 
strengths and downplay their weaknesses.38 Subconscious motives to see themselves as virtuous 
may produce the same faking behavior, even when responses are anonymous. Of course, it is 
possible to fake conscientiousness on a self-report questionnaire whereas it is impossible to fake 
superior reasoning ability on an IQ test. To a lesser degree, a similar bias may also operate in 
cognitive tests. Persons who know that their test scores will affect personnel or admissions 
decisions may try harder. The effects of faking on predictive validity have been well-studied by 
psychologists, who conclude that distortions have surprisingly minimal effects on prediction of 
job performance (Hough et al. 1990; Hough and Ones 2002; Ones and Viswesvaran 1998). 
Correcting for faking using scales designed to measure deliberate lying does not seem to improve 
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predictive validity (Morgeson et al. 2007). Nevertheless, when measuring cognitive and 
personality traits one should standardize for incentives and environment.  This leads to the next 
topic. 
C. A Benchmark Definition of Traits 
Although most personality psychologists rely on tests or observer reports to measure 
latent factors, behaviors in real world settings are also informative on those traits.  If this were 
not so, the latent traits would be of little interest to economists or psychologists.  The outputs of 
tasks ,i jT  defined in equation (1) may be test scores, observer reports or productivity 
measurements in social settings.  Test scores are proxies for the latent traits that generate 
behavior.  Thus the measurements of trait l in measurement situation n, ,
n
i lM  in equation (3) can 
be more broadly interpreted as a measure of performance in any situation. 
An ongoing debate in the personality literature concerns the existence and stability of 
latent traits.  An extreme view, advocated by Mischel (1968), claims that manifestations of traits 
are solely situation-specific. Traits do not exist except as manifestations of situations.  Any 
observed stability of traits is solely a consequence of stability of situations.  We summarize the 
evidence on this and related claims in section V.  First, we present a framework for thinking 
about this issue.  This framework is equally applicable to personality inventories, IQ test scores 
or to measurements on conventional economic preferences. 
To simplify notation, drop the subscript denoting person i.  In this notation, f is a vector 
of latent traits and fl is a particular trait in the list of L traits (extraversion, for example).  The 
manifestation of trait l, nlM  as opposed to the trait itself fl, is obtained by measurement n, 
n=1,…,Nl and may depend on incentives to manifest the trait.  Let nlR  be the reward for 
manifesting the trait in situation n.  Thus if extraversion is a desirable trait in n, and is highly 
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rewarded, there will be more manifest extraversion in n compared to less highly rewarded 
situations.  Reward can be interpreted very broadly to include the benefits of social approval, the 
approval of external observers and the like.  Other latent traits besides l may affect the 
manifestation of a trait for l.  Thus, pursuing the extraversion example, more highly intelligent 
persons may perceive the benefits of exhibiting extraversion in situation n.  Let f~l be the 
components of f apart from fl.  Let nlW  denote other variables operating in situation n that affect 
measured performance for l.   
Measured traits are imperfect proxies for true traits: 
(5)    ~( , , , ), 1,..., , 1,...,
n n n
l l l l l l LM h f f R W n N l L= = = . 
There may be threshold effects in all variables so the lh  function allows for jumps in manifest 
traits as the arguments of (5) are varied.  These functions may vary across individuals. 
Mischel (1968) claims that lh  does not depend on fl  because there is no fl (or for that 
matter f~l ) and indeed that the manifestation nlM  is solely a function of situational incentives 
n
lR  
and context nlW . Stability of measured traits is solely a consequence of stability of incentives 
and context.  Some behavioral economists have adopted this interpretation of personality. 
Even without taking this extreme position, equation (5) in the general case captures the 
intuition that it is unwise to equate the measurement of a trait with the trait itself without 
standardizing incentives and context.  It is only meaningful to define measurements on fl at 
benchmark levels of nlR , ~lf , and 
n
lW .  Define these benchmarks as lR , ~lf , and lW  
respectively.  At these benchmark values, one can define fl: 
(6)  ~ ~
, for , , , ,
1,..., ,   1,..., .
n n n
l l l l l l l ll l
l
M f R R f f f f W W
n N l L
= = =     = =
= =  
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This produces an operational definition of latent traits across measurement situations.  
Framework (5) accounts for the diversity of measurements on the same latent trait.  It is 
flexible enough to capture interactions among the traits and the notion that at high enough levels 
of certain traits, incentives ( nlR ) might not matter whereas at lower levels they might.  Thus, if 
the trait in question is intelligence, scores on IQ tests might depend on the level of 
conscientiousness of the test taker.  People with higher levels of conscientiousness may not 
respond to incentives on an IQ test, whereas those with lower levels of conscientiousness may be 
more motivated. 
Psychologists have not been careful in characterizing the benchmark states at which 
standard measurements are taken.  This substantially affects the transportability of tests to other 
environments beyond that of the test-taking environment. 39  Persons answering a questionnaire 
on a personality test in a general survey have different incentives to respond than persons who 
are applying for a job.  We review this literature below.  First we present a dramatic example of 
how incentives and personality traits affect the scores on IQ tests. 
D. IQ Scores Reflect Incentives and Measure Both Cognitive and Personality 
Traits 
Notwithstanding the very low correlations between IQ and most measures of personality, 
performance on intelligence and achievement tests depends in part on certain personality traits of 
the test taker, as well as their motivation to perform.40  A smart child unable to sit still during an 
exam or uninterested in exerting much effort can produce spuriously low scores on an IQ test.  
Moreover, many IQ tests also require factual knowledge acquired through schooling and life 
experience, which are in part determined by the motivation, curiosity, and persistence of the test 
taker.41 Thus, personality can have both direct and indirect effects on IQ test scores.  
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Almost 40 years ago, several studies called into question the assumption that IQ tests 
measure maximal performance (that is, performance reflecting maximal effort). These studies 
show that among individuals with low IQ scores, performance on IQ tests could be increased up 
to a full standard deviation by offering incentives such as money or candy, particularly on group-
administered tests and particularly with individuals at the low-end of the IQ spectrum.  (Thus 
incentives nlR  in equation (5) are varied.)  Engaging in complex thinking is effortful, not 
automatic (Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister 2003), and therefore motivation to exert effort 
affects performance. Zigler and Butterfield (1968) found that early intervention (nursery school, 
for example) for low SES kids may have a beneficial effect on motivation, not on cognitive 
ability per se. In their study, the benefits of intervention (in comparison to a no-treatment control 
group) on IQ were not apparent under testing conditions where motivation to perform well were 
maximized. Raver and Zigler (1997) and Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) present further 
evidence on this point.  Table 2 summarizes evidence that extrinsic incentives can substantially 
improve performance on tests of cognitive ability, especially among low-IQ individuals.42 
Segal (2006) shows that introducing performance-based cash incentives in a low-stakes 
administration of the coding speed test of the Armed Services Vocational Battery (ASVAB) 
increases performance substantially among roughly one-third of participants. Less conscientious 
men are particularly affected by incentives.  Thus in terms of equation (5), other traits (f~l) affect 
the manifestation of the trait in question (fl).  Segal’s work and a large body of related work 
emphasize heterogeneity in the motivations that affect human performance.  Borghans, Meijers, 
and ter Weel (2006) show that adults spend substantially more time answering IQ questions 
when rewards are higher, but subjects high in emotional stability and conscientiousness are less 
affected by these incentives. Similarly, Pailing and Segalowitz (2004) find that an event-related 
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potential (ERP) indexing the emotional response to making an error increases in amplitude when 
incentives are offered for superior test performance. 43  This effect is smaller for individuals high 
in conscientiousness and emotional stability. Thus, IQ scores do not accurately reflect maximal 
intellectual performance for individuals low in the personality traits related to conscientiousness 
and emotional stability.  The performance on the IQ test encodes, in part, how effective persons 
may be in application of their intelligence, that is, how people are likely to perform in a real-
world setting.  However, it is far from obvious that motivation on an exam and motivation in a 
real-world situation are the same. 
Like low motivation, test anxiety can significantly impair performance (Hembree, 1988). 
That is, subjects do worse when they worry excessively about how they are performing and when 
their autonomic nervous system over-reacts by increasing perspiration, heart rate, and so on. 
Because individuals who are higher in Big Five neuroticism are more likely to experience test 
anxiety, there is another reason, beyond incentives, why emotional stability can impact IQ scores 
(Moutafi, Furnham, and Tsaousis, 2006).   
Personality traits can also affect IQ scores indirectly through the knowledge acquired by 
individuals who are more open to experience, more curious, and more perseverant. Cunha and 
Heckman (2008) show a correlation between cognitive and personality factors of the order of 
0.3.  Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004), Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), and Urzua 
(2007) show how schooling and other acquired traits substantially causally affect measured 
cognitive and personality test scores. Cattell’s investment theory (1971) anticipates recent 
findings that knowledge and specific complex skills depend not only on fluid intelligence but 
also on the cumulative investment of effort and exposure to learning opportunities. 
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How, then, should one interpret a low IQ score? Collectively, the evidence surveyed here 
and in Table 2 suggests that IQ test performance reflects not only pure intelligence, but also 
anxiety, other personality traits, knowledge, intrinsic motivation, and reactions to extrinsic 
incentives to perform well, as indicated in (5).  The relative impurity of IQ tests likely varies 
from test to test and individual to individual.  Little effort to date has been made to standardize 
the context and incentives of tests.  The difficulty of creating a pure measure of intelligence 
suggests that Herrnstein and Murray (1994) likely overestimate the effect of pure intelligence on 
outcomes such as crime and wages.  To capture pure intelligence, it is necessary to adjust for the 
incentives, motivations, and context in which the measurements are taken, and traits other than 
intelligence, using the framework of equations (5) and (6).44   
E. Contextualizing Personality 
Recently, personality psychologists have begun to address the role of context, including 
rewards and observational frames, on the measurement of personality traits.  Bandura (1999), 
Roberts (2007), the papers in a special issue of the Journal of Personality, December, 2007, and 
McAdams (2006) discuss this issue.  Individuals in different roles (and with different incentives) 
manifest different traits. Equation (5) captures the effects on measurements of the level of the 
trait ( lf ), the incentives (
n
lR ) in a situation and the context (
n
lW ).  Interaction terms in equation 
(5) are called “mechanistic interactionism” (see Ozer, 1986 and Endler, 1982).  Emmons, Diener, 
and Larsen (1986), and Emmons and Diener (1986) present evidence of sorting and reciprocal 
interaction.  McAdams (2006) summarizes this literature.   
Although Mischel (1968) started the situational vs. trait debate, Mischel and Shoda 
(1998) implicitly accept specification (5) in their “if-then” analysis of conditional traits.  The 
situation affects the manifestation of the trait.  They conduct experiments that establish the 
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existence of stable traits across situations.  To date, little systematic empirical analysis within the 
framework of equations (5) or (6) has been developed except in papers by economists.45  This 
framework offers a promising way to quantify the effects of situations and latent traits on 
measurements. 
IV. The Evidence On Preference Parameters 
Many economists and some psychologists estimate the traditional preference parameters 
in economics: time preference, risk aversion and preference for leisure.  More recently, altruism 
and social preferences have been studied.  In this section, we review the evidence from the group 
of psychologists and economists who directly measure these preferences.  We discuss the 
findings of the personality psychologists in the next section.  Both types of measurements 
capture aspects of personality broadly defined.  They are two distinct approaches which are only 
partially integrated at the time of this writing. 
At the outset, we note that many of the measurements we survey in this and next section 
do not standardize for incentive and contextual effects.  This lack of standardization creates a 
serious problem in isolating true traits and making comparisons across studies.  In economic 
choices, market settings play a crucial role in policing behavior.  Even if individuals seek to 
exhibit irrational behavior, they must live within their constraints.  In a series of papers, List 
(2004, 2006, 2007) has shown how behavior in market settings alters the choices that are made in 
lab settings where market forces are absent.  Different incentives and context act on agents ( nlR  
and nlW  in (5)). 
A. Time Discounting 
Evidence from animal and human experiments suggests that future rewards are 
discounted non-exponentially as a function of delay. Notwithstanding a vigorous debate about 
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the best-fitting and most parsimonious mathematical models for discounting (McClure et al. 
2004; Ainslie and Monterosso 2004), there is some consensus in psychology that hyperbolic 
functions fit data from these experiments better than do exponential functions (Rachlin 2004; 
Ainslie 1991).  However, as noted by many economists, the evidence for hyperbolic discounting 
is far from solid.46 
Under hyperbolic discounting, future utility A is discounted to current utility value V  by 
the formula 
 
1
AV
kd
= +  
where d is the delay and k is the discount rate parameter.  Under exponential discounting, 
(1 )d
AV ρ= + , where ρ  is the discount rate. 
Several economists have used observational data to estimate discount rates.47,48  
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) point out that such field data may be 
complicated by the effects of factors such as imperfect information on the part of the subject 
about future rewards or credit constraints.  Standard econometric problems of endogeneity and 
measurement error plague the observational approach.  It is therefore potentially problematic to 
interpret discount rates estimated in this way.  These limitations build the case for experimental 
elicitations, but they have their own set of problems.49 
The most widely-used experimental approach to the measurement of discount rates poses 
a series of choices between smaller, immediate and larger, delayed monetary rewards (see Fuchs 
1982; Kirby and Marakovic 1996; Green and Myerson 2004; Rachlin 2006; and Thomas and 
Ward 1984), for example “Would you choose $1500 now or $4000 in five years?” (Fuchs 1982). 
These choices are typically among hypothetical items, but it is unclear whether discount rates for 
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real and hypothetical rewards are identical. No real world markets are operative.  Adjustments 
for contextual and incentive effects are not made in these studies. 
Johnson and Bickel (2002) and Madden et al. (2003) find no within-subject effect of 
reward type on discount rates, but Kirby (1997) finds higher discount rates for real rewards vs. 
hypothetical ones. Even when rewards are real, choosing the delayed reward in discount rate 
procedures does not require the participant to also sustain his or her choice (Reynolds and 
Schiffbauer 2005). In real life, one must not only choose delayed gratification but also maintain 
this choice in the face of immediate temptation. Typical discount rate elicitation procedures used 
by economists are akin to procedures that ask dieters whether they choose to forgo desserts for 
an entire week without measuring their ability to sustain their initial choice.50 
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) survey methods for measuring discount 
rates. They document that across studies, estimated discount rates of adult respondents range 
from -6 percent to infinity. Even more worrisome, questions about the discount rate reveal 
within-subject inconsistencies (Loewenstein and Prelec 1991) and can lead to very different 
estimates of this parameter in the same population. These irregularities are disturbing and can be 
traced to three major sources of error: confounds with individual differences unrelated to time 
preference (risk aversion, for example), framing effects, and other artifacts related to the 
particular procedure used, and situational influences on the psychological state of the 
respondent.51  No attempt is made to standardize for incentives, market forces, personality, 
cognitive traits, and context in this literature. 
Consider, for example, how an unrelated trait such as numeracy can distort estimates of 
time preference.52 Virtually all methods of estimating time preference assume that respondents 
are equally numerate, but Peters et al. (2006) show that this assumption is often untrue. 
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Furthermore, more numerate individuals are less susceptible to framing effects and draw stronger 
and more precise affective meaning from numbers and comparisons using numbers. The 
confound of numeracy may explain why more intelligent (or educated) individuals often display 
lower discount rates when decisions require complex calculations to compare subtly different 
delays or reward amounts (for example, de Wit et al. 2007; Dohmen et al., 2007) but does not 
shed light on why smarter individuals also have lower discount rates when choosing between 
relatively simple cash sums (Funder and Block 1989) and between non-cash rewards (such as 
smaller vs. larger candy bars in Mischel and Metzner 1962)53. A meta-analysis by Shamosh and 
Gray (2007) of 24 studies in which both IQ and discount rates were measured shows the two 
traits are inversely related (r = -.23). The complexity entailed by comparing the present and 
future values of rewards suggests that the inverse relationship between discount rates and 
intelligence is not just an artifact of measurement.  An individual with poor working memory and 
low intelligence may not be capable of accurately calculating or even perceiving the value of a 
deferred reward. At the least, making such calculations is more effortful (that is, costly) for 
individuals of low cognitive ability. If the cost of making calculations exceeds the expected 
benefit of such deliberation, the individual may choose by default the immediate, certain reward. 
Here the line between preference and constraint blurs – is this individual’s behavior best 
explained as a constraint on cognition or a preference?  We develop this point further in Section 
VII. 
Discount rates also appear to vary inversely with the size of reward (Green, Fry, and 
Myerson 1994; Kirby, 1997), and vary with the type of reward offered (Chapman, Nelson, and 
Hier 1999; Chapman and Coups 1999; Estle et al. 2007; Bickel, Odum, and Madden 1999; 
Bonato and Boland 1983). Insofar as estimates of discount rates are sensitive to context or 
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framing effects, they may fail the definitional requirements for separable economic preferences 
(see Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade 1999), but they are consistent with more general preference 
specifications, as we note in section VII. 
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue  (2002) argue that “the cumulative evidence 
raises serious doubts about whether there is, in fact, such a construct—a stable factor that 
operates identically on, and applies equally to, all sources of utility” (p. 392). Instead, Frederick 
et al. suggest that time preference is tri-dimensional, comprising three separate underlying 
motives: impulsivity, the tendency to act spontaneously and without planning, compulsivity; the 
tendency to stick with plans, and inhibition, the ability to override automatic responses to urges 
or emotions.  However, they do not provide a precise map between ρ  and these personality traits, 
nor do they show how exactly their three traits affect choice behavior.     
A parallel effort to define impulsivity and to decompose this trait into its constituent 
components is underway in the psychology literature.  To date, there is no agreement as to what 
these dimensions are (see Barratt, 1985; Buss and Plomin, 1975; Congdon and Canli, 2005; 
Eysenck, Easting, and Pearson, 1984; Olson, Schilling, and Bates, 1999; Revelle, 1997; White et 
al. 1994; Whiteside et al. 2005).   
An uninvestigated empirical question is whether estimates of the constituent components 
that give rise to time preference will prove more useful for economic models than currently used 
specifications.  The science of measuring preferences is almost a century behind the science of 
measuring IQ. 
B. Risk Preference 
The risk preference parameter (also referred to as “risk aversion” or “risk tolerance”) 
represents the curvature of the utility function. Using observational data, this parameter is often 
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estimated through Euler equations. Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) survey the literature 
and review the general framework.  
Survey techniques measure risk preferences in a more direct way, with methods parallel 
to the ones developed to measure time preference.  The key difference between time and risk 
preference is that time preference describes the devaluation of rewards as a function of their 
delay, whereas risk preference describes the devaluation of rewards as a function of their 
uncertainty. Of course, in the real world, risk and delay are inextricably confounded.  A standard 
result (Gorman, 1968) shows that, in a separable model, intertemporal substitution and risk 
aversion are indistinguishable attributes of preference specifications.  In addition, all deferred 
rewards carry with them some risk that they will not in fact be received. All consequences 
involving risk lie in the future.  If they were immediate, there would be no uncertainty to 
negotiate. Despite the common discounting process, however, Green and Myerson (2004) argue 
that the two constructs belong to different underlying psychological processes. As evidence, they 
point out that the two constructs react differently to the same effect: for example, an increase in 
the size of reward generally decreases the discount on time but increase it on probability.54  This 
is evidence against the standard intertemporally separable model of risk aversion. 
Survey questions assessing risk preference usually pose a series of questions involving 
the choice between a lottery and a certain outcome: “Which would you prefer: $100 dollars 
today, or a 50 percent chance of receiving nothing and a 50 percent chance of receiving $200?” 
Two recent studies have introduced measures of risk preferences in field experiments.  Harrison, 
Lau, and Rutstrom (2007) use real stakes to elicit risk preferences on a representative sample of 
253 people in Denmark. Dohmen et al. (2005) use a lottery experiment with a representative 
sample of 450 German adults to validate survey responses on risk preference from the 
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Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP).  In their study, the general SOEP question about “willingness to 
take risks, in general” answered on an 11-point scale predicts self-reported risky behavior in the 
domains of health, driving, financial matters, leisure, and so on better than does a typical lottery 
question. Also, such a general question is free from framing effects that shape behavior in 
presence of risk (Kahneman 2003). The findings for general samples suggest that preferences are 
best measured in ways that do not require a high level of numeracy. As we previously argued for 
time preference, the effects of numeracy and intelligence may not simply constitute 
methodological artifacts, but are root explanations for behavior in the face of uncertainty. As for 
time preference, in fact, there appears to be an inverse relationship between cognitive ability and 
risk aversion, where higher IQ people have higher risk tolerance (Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro 
2006; Dohmen et al. 2007).55   
Risk preference also varies with socioeconomic characteristics. However, there is no 
general consensus on the direction of such differences: some studies find a negative relationship 
between education and risk aversion (Weiss 1972; Belzil and Leonardi 2006; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
2005; Binswanger 1980, 1981; Guiso and Paiella 2001; and Andersen et al. 2005), while Barsky 
et al. (1997) find an inverse U-shaped relationship, with risk tolerance peaking at 12 years of 
education. There are some consistent patterns of a negative relationship between unemployment 
duration and risk aversion, (see Feinberg 1977, and Kohn and Schooler 1978). Most of the 
studies find that women are more risk averse than men56 (see Barsky et al. 1997; Donkers, 
Melenberg, and van Soest 2001; Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Jonker 2002; Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek 1998; see Eckel and Grossman 2008 for a review), but a few do not find this gender 
difference (see Andersen et al. 2005; Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund 2002; and Holt and 
Laury 2002). Parents and their children are similarly risk averse, and this effect is stronger 
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among children with fewer siblings and first-born children (Dohmen et al. 2006). Risk aversion 
dips sharply in adolescence (Steinberg, 2004, 2007) and then throughout adulthood seems to 
increase with age (Dohmen et al. 2005). 
The empirical findings summarized in this section assume that risk preference can be 
modelled with a single parameter across situations. Yet, like time preference, risk preference 
may be multidimensional rather than unitary.  Weber (2001) shows that risk preference varies by 
domain, and a scale that assesses risk taking in five different domains shows low correlations 
across these domains (Weber, Blais, and Betz 2002). One can be quite risk-averse when it comes 
to financial decisions but risk-loving when it comes to health decisions (Hanoch, Johnson, and 
Wilke 2006). Weber’s risk-return model of risk taking (Weber and Milliman 1997; Weber and 
Hsee 1998) finds that low correlations among risk taking preference across domains can be 
explained by domain-specific perceptions of riskiness and return.  Perhaps the relatively modest 
predictive validity of risk aversion for actual risk-taking behaviour (for example, Barsky et al. 
1997) might be improved considerably with a multidimensional and domain-specific approach to 
its measurement.  
A behavioral task and self-report measure from the psychology literature are of interest. 
Lejuez and colleagues (2002, 2003) have developed a behavioral task for risk preference. Their 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) is a computer game in which participants make repeated 
choices between keeping a certain smaller monetary reward and taking a chance on an 
incrementally larger reward. Scores on the BART correlate with real-world risk behaviors such 
as smoking, stealing, and not wearing a seatbelt. BART scores also correlate with sensation 
seeking, a trait proposed by Zuckerman (1994) and defined as “the tendency to seek novel, 
varied, complex, and intense sensations and experiences and the willingness to take risks for the 
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sake of such experience.”57  More than 2000 published articles have incorporated sensation 
seeking self-report questionnaires, and collectively these studies have established that sensation 
seeking predicts risky driving, substance use and abuse, smoking, drinking, unprotected sex, 
juvenile delinquency, and adult criminal behavior (see Zuckerman 2007 for a review).  This 
broadens the notion of risk aversion to include the enjoyment of risk, per se, at least over certain 
ranges.  Unfortunately, few, if any studies, have included typical risk preference propositions of 
the sort relevant to economic decision making when sensation seeking is estimated.58  An 
integration of these two endeavors would be useful. 
C. Preference for Leisure 
There is a large literature on estimating leisure preferences.  See Killingsworth (1985), 
Pencavel (1986), Heckman (1993), and Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) for surveys of 
labor supply elasticities.59  Pencavel (1986) discusses the evidence on experimental estimates of 
labor supply functions in field settings. 
Survey-based estimates of preferences for leisure are less common, probably because 
direct measurement is complicated.60 Comparable questions that capture the economic concepts 
often give results that vary substantially in level, although generally different measures are 
correlated. Difficulties people face in understanding economic trade-offs might be a reason for 
this. Estimates of leisure demand based on psychological questionnaires often predict outcomes 
better. One reason why self-report measures of personality have higher predictive validities for 
outcomes may be their superior reliability and, consequently, lower error variance, but this has 
not been explicitly investigated. A second advantage of self-report measures is that questions are 
deliberately phrased to emphasize typical behavior and, thus, responses are less likely affected 
by situational factors. This results in lower error variance. 
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Most omnibus measures of personality include scales closely related to preference for 
leisure or, more frequently, the obverse trait of preference for work. The widely used Big Five 
(or NEO-PI-R, Costa and McCrae 1992b), whose components and facets are summarized in 
Table 1, includes an Achievement Striving subscale of Conscientiousness, which describes 
ambition, the capacity for hard work, and an inclination toward purposeful behavior. Jackson’s 
Personality Research Form (1974) includes an achievement scale measuring the aspiration to 
accomplish difficult tasks and to put forth effort to attain excellence, as well as an endurance 
scale, measuring willingness to work long hours and perseverance in the face of difficulty, and a 
play scale, measuring the inclination to participate in games, sports, and social activities “just for 
fun.” A recent factor analysis of seven major personality inventories identified industriousness as 
one of six facets of Conscientiousness (Roberts et al. 2005a).  
D. Altruism and Social Preferences 
There is a large literature in economics on altruism and an emerging literature in 
economics on social preferences.  Papers by Bergstrom (1997) and Laitner (1997) discuss 
models of interdependent family preferences.  Andreoni (1995) shows that pure models of 
altruism are inconsistent with his evidence.  His “warm glow” version of altruism suggests that 
giving for giving’s sake is valued.  Part of the difficulty in measuring altruism is that it entails 
tracing links between multiple agents typically followed over time, and it is difficult to use 
laboratory experiments to isolate altruism.  Villanueva (2005) and Laferrère and Wolff (2006) 
summarize the mixed evidence on altruism in families. 
A recent literature explores social preferences which are distinct from altruism per se.  
Altruism is based on the assumption that the preferences of one agent depend on the 
consumption or utility of other agents.  Social preferences are preferences that depend on agent’s 
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evaluations of a social condition (inequality, for example) or the intentions of other agents.  
Meier (2007) surveys the evidence on other forms of altruism and on pro-social behavior more 
generally.  Fehr and Schmidt (1999) analyze inequality aversion (in which people dislike 
inequality rather than valuing the consumption or utility of agents per se).  Fehr and Gächter 
(2000), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) present evidence on reciprocity and conditional 
cooperation, in which agents act in a pro-social or antisocial manner depending on the behavior 
of others with whom they interact.  Fehr and Schmidt (2006) summarize the theory and empirical 
support for social preferences.  Their research suggests that social preferences distinct from pure 
altruism may play an important role in shaping individual behaviors.  To date, there has been no 
attempt to relate social preferences to the Big Five personality traits that we discuss next, even 
though at an intuitive level social preferences should be linked with empathy and outgoingness. 
V. Predictive Power of Personality Traits  
The importance of personality traits can be inferred from the failure of cognitive 
measures to predict certain outcomes. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) use evidence from the 
General Education Development (GED) testing program (an exam-certified alternative high 
school degree) to demonstrate the quantitative importance of personality traits.  GED recipients 
have the same cognitive ability as high school graduates who do not go on to college, as 
measured by scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT).  Controlling for cognitive 
ability, GED recipients actually have lower hourly wages and obtain lower levels of schooling 
than high school dropouts. GED recipients also have higher job turnover rates, and are more 
likely to drop out of the army and post secondary schooling (Heckman and LaFontaine 2007). 
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) show that the power of the personality traits they consider 
equals or exceeds the predictive power of cognitive traits for schooling, occupational choice, 
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wages, health behaviors, teenage pregnancy, and crime.  As noted in the introduction, evidence 
from the Perry Preschool Project suggests that Perry did not raise IQ, but did promote a variety 
of positive behaviors (see Heckman and Masterov, 2007). 
In the psychology literature, there is substantial evidence on the importance of 
personality traits in predicting socioeconomic outcomes including job performance, health, and 
academic achievement (Barrick and Mount 1991; Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham 2005; 
Hampson et al. 2006; Hogan, Hogan, and Roberts, 1996; Hogan and Holland 2003; Robbins et 
al. 2006; Roberts et al., 2007, Ones et al. 2007; Schmidt and Hunter 1998). Figure 2 summarizes 
correlations for the predictive validity of IQ and Big Five personality factors on leadership 
ratings, job performance, longevity, college grades, and years of education. Observed 
correlations are presented as well as, where available, true score correlations that are corrected 
for attenuation due to restriction on range or lack of reliability.61  These estimates derive from 
meta-analyses and reviews in the psychology literature.62  Wherever available, estimates from 
longitudinal studies are favored over cross-sectional estimates.  We repeat the qualification of 
our review of the evidence that we made in Section IV.  With the exceptions noted below, little 
empirical research in the literature standardizes for incentives and context, or directly controls 
for reverse causality. 
Figure 3 shows that IQ surpasses any single Big Five personality factor in the prediction 
of the two academic outcomes, college grades (r = .45) and years of education (r = .55). Big Five 
conscientiousness is by far the best personality predictor of grades (r = .22) and, after openness 
to experience, the second-best personality predictor of years of education (r = .11).63 
Conscientiousness is a slightly better predictor of longevity (r = .09) than is IQ (r = .06). 
Conscientiousness predicts leadership ratings (r = .20) slightly better than IQ does (r = .17). 
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Conscientiousness predicts job performance (r = .13; corrected r = .22) better than does any 
other Big Five factor, but not as well as IQ does (r = .21; corrected r = .55). The importance of 
IQ increases with job complexity, defined as the information processing requirements of the job: 
cognitive skills are more important for professors, scientists, and senior managers than for semi-
skilled or unskilled laborers (Schmidt and Hunter 2004).64 In contrast, the importance of 
conscientiousness does not vary much with job complexity (Barrick and Mount 1991).  
Contemporary psychologists (for example Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham 2003; 
Digman and  Takemoto-Chock 1981; Duckworth and Seligman, 2005; Mischel, Shoda, and 
Peake 1988; Noftle and Robins 2007; Ones et al. 2007; Paunonen and Ashton 2001; Robbins et 
al. 2006; Salgado 1997; Shoda, Mischel, and Peake 1990; Wolfe and Johnson 1995) and earlier 
researchers (for example, Hull and Terman 1928; Harris 1940; Wechsler 1940; and Barton 
Dielman, and Cattell 1972) suggest that self-control, perseverance, and other aspects of 
conscientiousness as the major personality contributors to success in school and in life. (For a 
more detailed review of personality, IQ, and academic performance, see Chamorro-Premuzic and 
Furnham 2005.)65  As noted previously, Big Five conscientiousness is conceptually related to 
risk aversion, leisure preference, and time preference. Aspects of Big Five neuroticism (more 
helpfully termed by its obverse, Big Five emotional stability) are next in importance. Nyhus and 
Pons (2005) have shown, for example that emotional stability predicts higher wages, and 
Salgado (1997) shows that emotional stability and conscientiousness are more predictive of job 
performance across professions than other Big Five dimensions.  As described in more detail 
below, Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) and Judge and Hurst (2007) show that among 
participants in the NLSY 1979 cohort, positive self-evaluations measured in young adulthood 
(with self-report questions of self-esteem, locus of control, and related traits) predict income in 
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mid-life and, further, enhance the benefits of family socioeconomic status, and academic 
achievement on mid-life income. Hogan and Holland (2003) have also shown measures 
emotional stability to be potent and general predictors of job performance (inversely), with 
predictive validities corrected for range restriction and unreliability of r = .43. Whether 
predictive validities for self-report measures of personality are large enough to warrant their use 
in personnel selection is a matter of vigorous debate (see Morgeson et al. 2007; Tett and 
Christiansen 2007; Ones et al. 2007).  
A. Limitations of Current Evidence on Predictive Validity 
There are five reasons why effect size estimates summarized in Figure 3 may 
underestimate the impact of personality traits. First, whereas the benefits of IQ are monotonically 
increasing (that is, more is always better), the optimal level of most personality traits may lie 
somewhere between the two extremes (see Benson and Campbell 2007 and LaHuis, Martin and 
Avis 2005). Indeed, Wiggins and Pincus (1989) and others have speculated that clinically 
diagnosable personality disorders represent combinations of extreme points (that is, an extreme 
excess or lack) on the continuum of each of the Big Five factors.  Curvilinear relationships are, 
of course, not well represented by correlation coefficients.  
Second, short personality measures that yield a single score for each Big Five domain are 
too blunt an instrument to capture relationships between personality and outcomes. Stronger 
relationships between personality and outcomes often emerge when more narrowly defined 
facets are used (Paunonen and Ashton 2001). For example, Roberts et al. (2005a) show that 
lower-level facets of Conscientiousness (for example, the traits of industriousness, self-control) 
have differential relationships with labor market and other outcomes, and, further, that these 
traits considered individually may predict outcomes better than a broad measure of 
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Conscientiousness. An example of the dramatic impact of a very specifically defined and 
carefully measured personality trait comes from Mischel and colleagues, who show that delay of 
gratification (measured as the number of seconds children can wait for a larger treat in lieu of a 
smaller, immediate treat) at age four predicts higher academic and social functioning in 
adolescence (Mischel, Shoda, and Peake 1988; Shoda, Mischel, and Peake 1990). The 
correlations between time preference and SAT scores over a decade later are dramatic (r = .42 
for SAT verbal and r = .57 for SAT math; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989).  
Hogan (2005) makes a related point regarding the specificity and appropriateness of 
outcome variables: “Researchers often fail to align predictors with criteria; this results in using 
measures of conscientiousness to predict service orientation, or measures of extraversion to 
predict training performance…” (p. 333). This argument is consistent with the operation of 
comparative advantage in the labor market and in a variety of other areas of social life.  In some 
tasks, certain traits may be useful; in other tasks, they may not be useful. 
Third, personality in large-sample studies is almost invariably measured by brief, self-
report questionnaires, and this approach yields less reliable and less precise estimates of the 
effects of personality on outcomes than do IQ tests. Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004) show that 
the limitations of self-report questionnaires extend beyond vulnerability to faking and include the 
tendency of most individuals to overrate their skills. Despite general recognition of these 
limitations and the handicap they present for assessing the importance of personality traits, few 
novel measurement approaches have been validated for many traits of interest—and none that 
would be feasible in the sort of large-scale data set favored by economists (see Wittman 2002). 
Thus, whereas multi-source, multi-method approaches to personality measurement are superior, 
they are difficult if not impossible to implement in many research contexts. To the extent that IQ 
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is more accurately measured than personality, estimates of the effects of personality on outcomes 
will be disproportionately attenuated (see Duckworth and Seligman 2005).  Accounting for 
measurement error is empirically important in using psychometric measurements in empirical 
work.  Cunha and Heckman (2008) estimate substantial measurement error components in both 
cognitive and noncognitive test scores. 
A fourth limitation of the estimates in Figure 3 is that they do not capture interaction 
effects. It is possible, for example, that specific personality traits moderate the effect of cognitive 
skills and resources on outcomes. Consider the following evidence from the literature. Judge and 
colleagues identify a low-dimensional factor called core self-evaluations,66 encompassing high 
self-esteem, high generalized self-efficacy, internal locus of control, and high emotional stability 
(Judge, Locke, and Durham 1997; Judge and Bono 2001). Judge and Hurst (2007) analyze data 
from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY79). They find that high SES, strong 
academic performance, and educational attainment in adolescence and young adulthood predict 
higher incomes later in life only among participants who were above-average in core self-
evaluations. In contrast, adolescents who were below-average in core self-evaluations do not 
capitalize on these resources. Judge and colleagues speculate that high core self-evaluations lead 
to several advantageous behaviors, including looking for more challenging jobs, persisting 
longer on difficult tasks, and maintaining motivation in the face of failure.67  
Finally, standard measures of predictive power are effect size and variance explained. 
However, R2, or goodness of fit measures, are only one way to measure the importance of 
variables.68  Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) develop a different measure of predictive 
power based not on variance explained, but on the response of outcomes to a change in the 
variable.  They examine the effect of moving people from different percentiles in the latent factor 
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distributions of cognitive and personality skills on the following outcomes: (a) participation in 
and completion of schooling; (b) wages; (c) crime; (d) teenage pregnancy; (e) occupational 
choice, and (f) participation in risky behaviors.  Their measure does not depend on the scale of 
the variable—just the change in its rank in an overall distribution.69  They find that personality 
traits have lower predictive power (in the sense of R2) than cognitive traits but that moving from 
the top decile to the bottom decile on either cognitive or personality traits has comparable effects 
on all outcomes although there are important differences by gender. Cunha and Heckman (2008); 
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) and Urzua (2007) show the importance of measurement 
error on both cognitive and personality constructs.  Their emphasis on establishing causal rather 
than merely predictive effects of personality, and in accounting for measurement error is a 
distinctive feature of the recent literature on personality in economics. 70  
VI. Changing Preference Parameters and Psychological Variables 
Given the impact of personality traits on life outcomes, it is important to know how much 
they can change.  If they change, to what extent do environments and investments influence the 
developmental trajectories of personality traits?71  
The malleability of personality can be defined and measured in several ways: Mean-level 
change refers to change over time in absolute levels of a trait and is measured by changes in 
scores over time.  Rank-order change, in contrast, refers to changes in the ordinal ranking of a 
trait in a population and is measured by test-retest rank correlations. Mean-level and rank-order 
change capture independent effects (Block and Haan 1971). For example, cognitive abilities 
exhibit dramatic mean-level change from early childhood through adolescence, but, over the 
same period, strong rank-order stability. Rank-order may change dramatically without any 
resulting mean-level change if a subpopulation shows an increase on a trait while an equal 
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proportion of the population decreases to offset it. 
An extreme but common view among psychologists is that dramatic rank-order or mean-
level change in personality is nearly impossible after early adulthood. The speculation of 
William James (1890) that “in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, 
and will never soften again” (pp. 125-126) is widely held (see Costa and McCrae 1994; McCrae 
and Costa 1990, 1994, 1996, 2003).  Mounting evidence suggests that the set-like-plaster view is 
not correct. 
A second useful dichotomy contrasts normative change, defined as changes that are 
typical of the average individual in a given population, and caused either by biological 
programming (ontogenic) or by predictable changes in social roles (sociogenic), and non-
normative change, encompassing both intentional change, caused by deliberate, self-directed 
efforts, deliberately chosen changes in social roles and atypical life events (trauma, for 
example)72. More relevant to the current review is intentional change—can investments be made 
by the person or the parent that change ability or preferences?  
A. Mean Level Changes 
During the early years of life, mean-level changes in traits are obvious and dramatic. For 
example, children become dramatically more capable of self-control as they move from infancy 
into toddler and preschool years (McCabe, Cunnington, and Brooks-Gunn 2004; Mischel and 
Metzner 1962; Vaughn, Kopp, and Krakow 1984; Posner and Rothbart 2000). But mean-level 
changes in traits are also apparent, albeit less extreme, later in life. In a 2006 meta-analysis of 
longitudinal studies, Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer (2006) examine cumulative lifetime 
change in Big Five openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and agreeableness; they split Big 
Five extraversion into social dominance and social vitality. Figure 4a shows that people typically 
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become more socially dominant (a facet of Extraversion), conscientious, and emotionally stable 
across the life course, whereas social vitality and openness to experience rise early in life and 
then fall in old age. Surprisingly, after childhood, the greatest mean-level change in most 
personality traits takes place not during the tumultuous years of adolescence, but rather in young 
adulthood. An exception is the trait of sensation seeking, discussed earlier as a trait related to risk 
aversion.  There is a dramatic peak in sensation seeking during adolescence that has been 
associated with synchronous changes in brain structure and function (Spear 2000a,b).  
In contrast, a longitudinal study of adult intellectual development shows mean-level 
declines in cognitive skills, particularly cognitive processing speed, after age 55 or so (Schaie 
1994). The top panel of Figure 4b shows mean-level changes in cognitive skills using a 
longitudinal analysis, and the bottom panel of Figure 4b shows mean-level changes using a 
cross-sectional analysis73.  Fluid intelligence decreases much more dramatically than does 
crystallized intelligence, and crystallized intelligence (acquired skills and knowledge) rises over 
the life course (Horn 1970). Figure 4c presents a schematic of the lifetime development of the 
two types of intelligences. The importance of crystallized intelligence would explain why an 18-
year old undergraduate taking organic chemistry for the first time might be surpassed by a 
chemistry professor thrice his age, despite the superior fluid intelligence of the student. It also 
explains why most of us would rather use an experienced cardiac surgeon who has seen hundreds 
of cases just like ours to perform our surgery, rather than an exceptionally bright young surgeon 
with minimal experience. 
B. Rank-Order Change in Cognitive and Personality Skills 
Rank-order stability in personality increases steadily over the lifespan.  Figure 5a shows 
graphs of rank order stability of personality by age.  A meta-analysis by Roberts and DelVecchio 
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(2000) summarizes longitudinal studies where the average lag between assessments was at least 
a year and averaged 6.8 years.  It shows that test-retest stability estimates rise from r = .35 for 
birth-2.9 years to r = .52 for 3-5.9 years to r = .45 for 6-11.9 years to r = .47 for 12 to 17.9 years.  
They show that rank-order stability estimates for personality plateau far from unity, at r = .74, 
about the same level as terminal stability estimates for IQ. However, personality does not reach 
this plateau until at least age 50; whereas IQ reaches this plateau by age six or eight (Schuerger 
and Witt 1989; Hopkins and Bracht 1975). Figure 5b shows rank order stability of IQ over broad 
age ranges.  Hartog (2001) reviews the evidence on rank order stability in economic preferences. 
C. Mechanisms of Change for Cognitive and Personality Traits 
What mechanisms underlie stability and change in personality?  Why do most of us 
mature into more responsible, agreeable, confident, and emotionally stable individuals as we 
age? Why do our personality traits, relative to others in our age-group, steadily stabilize as we 
approach our fifties? If, as McCrae and colleagues have claimed, normative changes reflect 
genetically programmed processes, investment should not affect change. The current literature in 
psychology claims that genetic factors are largely responsible for stability in personality in 
adulthood whereas environmental factors are mostly responsible for change (Blonigen et al., 
2006; Plomin and Nesselroade 1990).74  In a longitudinal study of twins surveyed at age 20 and 
then again at age 30, about 80 percent of the variance of the stable component of personality was 
attributed to genetic factors (McGue, Bacon, and Lykken 1993). In the same study, change in 
personality was mostly attributed to environmental factors. Helson et al. (2002), for example, has 
documented the substantial influence that social roles and cultural milieu can have on personality 
development.  This is consistent with the economic model of investment and the response of 
manifest traits to incentives. However, there is recent evidence suggesting that environmental 
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factors, and in particular stable social roles, also contribute to stability in personality and that 
genetic factors can contribute to change (see Roberts, Wood, and Caspi 2008 for a review). 
Research on IQ also points to the enduring effects of genes, which are with us all of our 
lives, in contrast to more transient effects of environmental influences, which depend on a 
multitude of unstable variables, including social roles, levels of physical maturity and decline,, 
and historical and cultural milieu.75 Increases in the heritability of IQ from childhood (about 40 
percent) to adulthood (estimates range from 60 percent to 80 percent) are well-documented in 
behavioral genetics studies and likely reflect increasing control of the individual (vs. parents) 
over environment (Bergen, Gardner, and Kendler 2007; McGue et al. 1993; Plomin et al. 
2002).76 Heritability estimates for Big Five traits are relatively stable across the life course at 
about 40 to 60 percent (Bouchard and Loehlin 2001).77  Behavioral genetics studies typically 
estimate the effect of parental environments to be near zero, but Turkheimer et al. (2003) find 
estimates from such studies to be biased downward by the over-representation of middle and 
upper-class families. Krueger and colleagues have recently demonstrated that other moderators 
may influence the heritability of traits (see Krueger et al., 2008). Among poor families, 
Turkheimer et al. find that 60 percent of the variance in IQ is accounted for by shared 
environment and heritability estimates are almost nil, whereas among affluent families, the result 
is reversed. 
Genes exert their influence in part through the selection and evocation of environments 
that are compatible with one’s genotype—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “gene-
environment correlation” or “nature via nurture” (see Rutter 2006). As individuals move from 
childhood to adulthood, they have more control over their environments, and thus gene-
environment correlation becomes more important because shared environments become less 
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common.78  
Substantial but temporary influence from environment is a basic assumption of the 
Dickens-Flynn model reconciling the high heritability of IQ and massive gains of IQ between 
generations (Dickens and Flynn 2001).79 The relatively short half-life of common environmental 
influences may also explain why adopted children resemble their biological parents more and 
more and their adopted parents less and less as they grow older (Scarr, Weinberg, and Waldman 
1993).80  Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2006) develop an economic model of parenting that explains 
the evidence on twins raised apart that shows conditions under which parents will differentially 
affect their children.   
It is important to note that the family studies of genetic influence measure only the effects 
of shared environments, which become less similar as children age.  Thus even identical twins 
may be motivated to seek out different environments over time (Rutter 2006).  Recent evidence 
that first born children grow up, on average, to have three points higher IQ than their younger 
siblings reinforces the point that sharing parents does not necessarily imply identical 
environments in childhood (Kristensen and Bjerkedal 2007). 
What other than preprogrammed genetic influences might account for mean-level 
changes in personality? Personality change in adulthood may be precipitated by major shifts in 
social roles (for example, getting a job for the first time, becoming a parent). Clausen and Gilens 
(1990) claim that female labor force participation increases self-confidence.  Gottschalk (2005) 
presents experimental evidence that women forced to work due to welfare reform showed gains 
in self-confidence and self-esteem.  Roberts (1997) reports an increase of social dominance and 
Roberts and Chapman (2000) a decrease in neuroticism for working women. Others show that 
marital and family experiences shape personality (Helson and Picano 1990, Roberts, Helson, and 
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Klohnen 2002).81   
Cognitive ability can also be affected by environmental factors.  Cahan and Cohen (1989) 
use a quasi-experimental paradigm comparing children who differ in both age and schooling to 
show that schooling increases intelligence test scores independently of age.82  Schooler and 
colleagues show that complex (that is, cognitively demanding) work increases intellectual 
functioning among adults and vice versa (Schooler, Mulatu, and Oates 1999; Kohn and Schooler 
1978). If social role changes are experienced by most people in a population at the same time, we 
will observe the effects as mean-level changes in personality. If, on the other hand, these social 
roles are not assumed synchronously, we will observe rank-order changes. One difficulty with 
many of these studies is the problem of reverse causality discussed in Section III and analyzed in 
Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) and Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006). Changes in 
personality may drive social role changes rather than the other way around.  However, the 
experimental analysis of Gottschalk (2005) suggests genuine causal effect of work on personality 
traits. 
Are the effects of environment on personality change long-lasting? Do changes endure 
after the environmental cause is removed? At the moment, the prevailing view in psychology is 
relatively pessimistic.  McGue, Bacon, and Lykken (1993) suggest that only permanent changes 
in environment (for example, a social role like parenthood) might budge personality: 
“Environmental factors do not exert cumulative long-lasting influences and that, even when 
substantial, environmental factors do not normally lead, in adulthood, to a long-term redirection 
to the individual course of personality development…Environmental factors are most likely to 
influence behavioral stability when they are consistently and persistently experienced” (pp. 105-
106).  However, there is insufficient evidence from longitudinal studies to confirm this 
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viewpoint, and the analysis of the Perry Preschool study by Heckman et al. (2007) strongly 
suggests that long-term personality factors can be altered by interventions.  Finally, it is 
important to note individual differences in developmental trajectories: conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, and emotional stability not only increase with age, but also correlate with 
personality consistency (Caspi, Roberts, and Shiner 2005). 
The enduring effects of environment are greater earlier in life. Duyme, Dumaret, and 
Tomkiewicz (1999) studied children with IQs below 86 who were adopted between the ages of 
four and six into stable homes. In adolescence, children adopted into high SES homes gained an 
average of 19.5 IQ points; children adopted into low SES homes showed an average gain of 7.7 
IQ points. In studies of Romanian children taken from impoverished orphanages and placed into 
middle-class British homes, the long-term salutary effects of adoption on cognitive ability were 
dramatic when infants were placed before they reached six months, and markedly less so when 
adoption was delayed until later ages (Beckett et al. 2006). Notably, children adopted at different 
ages between six to 42 months did not differ at age 11 from each other in the terms of cognitive 
ability, with all children demonstrating an average deficit of 15 IQ points relative to children 
who had been adopted earlier in life. The effects of low nutrition had no effect on cognitive 
outcomes at age 11, suggesting a prominent role for psychological deprivation. As Beckett and 
colleagues point out, these findings are consistent with the existence of a very early critical or 
sensitive period for intellectual development (in which particular environmental stimuli are 
necessary for normative axonal rewiring (see Uylings, 2006 and Rutter, 2006, for reviews).83 
Knudsen et al. (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2007) summarize this evidence and relate it to 
models of investment in economics.  
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Cunha and Heckman (2007) summarize the evidence on the impact of parental 
investment on the evolution of cognitive and personality skills.  Their paper in this issue and 
their extension of that paper with Schennach establish evidence on sensitive periods in the 
development of the child.84  In their framework, the latent traits are time (or age) subscripted: 
,i tf .  Each of the measurement equations or variables is time subscripted.  The traits evolve by 
equations of motion over the life cycle T: 
(7)     ( ), 1 , ,,i t i t i tf f INψ+ = ,   1, ,t T= K , 
where ,i tIN  is a vector of experience related to inputs which can include the parental and school 
environments, experiences in the workplace, and the like.  The initial condition ,0if  reflects 
genetic material and the in utero environment that determines the initial stock of traits. 
Both cognitive and personality skills can be affected by parental investment and 
schooling, which are components of ,i tIN .  Sensitive periods for cognitive skills come earlier 
than sensitive periods for personality skills.  Sensitive periods are periods in which investment 
has especially high productivity for a trait (see Cunha and Heckman, 2007).  Cognitive and 
personality skills cross-fertilize each other with high stocks of each skill at one age improving 
the productivity of investments at later ages.85  The evidence of cross-fertilization from 
personality skills to cognitive skills is stronger than evidence for the cross-fertilization of 
cognitive skills to personality skills. Both cognitive and personality skills affect adult outcomes 
but they have different relative importance in explaining different outcomes.  See Cunha and 
Heckman (2008) and Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2007) for descriptions of the methods 
used to estimate the production relationships.  These methods also control for the problem of 
reverse causality in the psychological measurements. 
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The accomplishments of psychotherapy also support the possibility of intentional, mean-
level, and rank-order change. In a 1980 meta-analysis, Smith, Glass, and Miller summarized 575 
controlled studies, concluding that individuals who undergo psychotherapy are about 0.85 
standard deviations better on outcome measures than those who do not. The large benefits of 
therapy are not permanent, however: the effect of psychotherapy over control conditions falls to 
about half a standard deviation two years after therapy is concluded. Moreover, it is not clear that 
the effects of psychotherapy on individuals who seek change generalize to individuals who are 
not actively seeking treatment for a condition that causes them distress.86 
More evidence on the possibility of intentional change comes from the psychological 
literature on expertise. Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Romer (1993) demonstrate across domains 
as diverse as chess, musical performance, and digit span memory, that thousands of hours of 
sustained, deliberate practice lead to dramatic improvements in skill.  Ericsson points out that the 
top performers in nearly every field do not reach world-class levels of skill until at least ten years 
of deliberate practice. Ericsson also points out that because well-designed practice is the key to 
skill development.87 
Early interventions, such as enriched childcare centers coupled with home visitations, 
have been successful in alleviating some of the initial disadvantages of children born into 
adverse conditions.  See Cunha et al. (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2007) for evidence on 
these interventions.  As noted in the introduction to this paper, while these interventions were 
originally designed to improve the cognitive skills of children, their success has mostly been in 
boosting personality skills. For example, the Perry Preschool Program, an enriched early 
childhood intervention evaluated by random assignment where treatments and controls are 
followed to age 40, did not boost IQ but raised achievement test scores, schooling, and social 
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skills.  It raised personality skills but not cognitive skills, at least as measured by IQ.  Effects 
were not uniform across gender groups (Heckman, 2004; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006). 
See the evidence in Cunha et al. (2006) and Heckman et al (2007).  
D. Stability of Economic Preference Parameters 
Less is known about the stability of economic preferences.  To our knowledge, no 
longitudinal study has measured the mean-level or rank-order stability of time preference over 
the life cycle (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue. 2002). A handful of cross-sectional 
studies using relatively small samples have examined mean-level stability, and their findings are 
mixed. Green, Fry, and Myerson (1994) and Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) find that 
discount rates are lower among older individuals. On the other hand, Chesson and Viscusi (2000) 
claim to find that older adults have higher discount rates than younger adults.  Chao et al. (2007), 
de Wit et al. (2007), and Coller and Williams (1999) find no relationship between age and 
discount rate. Finally, Read and Read (2004) find a curvilinear relationship in which older people 
discount more than younger people, and middle-aged people discount less than either group. 
Sahm (2007) shows that risk aversion increases with age. 
In summary, the answer to the question of whether change in personality is possible must 
be a definitive yes, both in terms of mean-level and rank-order change. However, change may be 
more difficult later in the life cycle, change may be more enduring for some (such as more 
emotionally stable individuals) than for others, change may require persistent and consistent 
environmental pressure (as opposed to transient pressure from short-term interventions), and 
there are powerful forces for stability (such as genes and habit) which make change difficult. 
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VII. Frameworks for Integrating Personality and Economics  
This section attempts to integrate the main lessons summarized in the preceding sections 
into formal economic models.  As noted in section IV, preference anomalies have attracted a lot 
of attention in the recent literature in behavioral economics. 88  However, choice is generated by 
preferences, expectations, and constraints, and psychology has something to say about each of 
these aspects of agent decision making.   
We show how psychological variables, which define capacities and constraints, can enter 
standard choice models.  Some traits can be enhanced through investment and experience.  Traits 
may be divisible so that more of a trait used in one activity may reduce the supply of traits to 
other activities. Some traits may be public goods, available at the same level to all tasks.  We 
create a taxonomy of traits to motivate future research on the economics of personality.   
Bowles and Gintis (1976), Mueser (1979), Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001), Hartog 
(2001), and Mueller and Plug (2006) consider how specific traits affect earnings capacities.  Our 
discussion is more comprehensive than theirs because we consider how traits affect performance 
in many distinct areas of economic and social life.  We also speculate about the relationship of 
the Big Five personality factors to conventional economic preference parameters.  As yet, no 
tight link has been established.  Cognition and personality likely both affect conventional 
preference parameters.  Despite a hundred years of intelligence testing, IQ remains to be 
systematically integrated into economic theory apart from its direct effect on earnings. 
A. Psychological Variables as Constraints 
Capacities may be physical (beauty and strength, for example), cognitive (abstract 
reasoning) and those related to personality.  Capacities determine, for example, how effectively 
persons process information, cope with uncertainty, adjust to setbacks, envision counterfactual 
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states, project into the future as well as their sense of pride in their work.  These capacities affect 
learning, social engagement and even the definition of self.  They are in part acquired, and there 
is evidence that aspects of these capacities are heritable.   
The conventional neoclassical model of economics postulates quasiconcave preferences 
embedded in a model with uncertainty and constraints.  A large literature analyzes this model 
under a variety of constraints, market arrangements and expectation schemes (see Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green, 1995 for an example).  Versions of the model emphasize how information 
revelation in different market settings affects agent choices.  Preferences postulated a priori play 
a central role in this theory as they do in most research in behavioral economics.   
However, individual differences in personality and cognition shape the constraints of 
individuals and hence their choices.  To show how far one can go in developing models that 
recognize the centrality of constraints to economic choice theory, it is instructive to consider a 
simple model without standard preferences where constraints alone (including expectations of 
feasible states) shape choices.  A constraint-driven model need not produce a unique choice 
outcome for all persons with the same constraints.89  In this framework, agents have no 
preferences and act like molecules in a Brownian motion constrained only by choice sets.  As the 
choice sets change, the constrained molecules must change their choices to respect the 
boundaries created by the constraints.  As emphasized by Becker (1962) and Sanderson (1974), 
with sufficient generality in the specification of the constraint set, one can generate all of the 
predictions of neoclassical choice theory from constraints and not preferences. 
Following Thurstone (1927), Block and Marschak (1960), Bock and Jones (1968), and 
McFadden (1974, 1981), write the utility of agent i for choice l as Ui,l.  In terms of the literature 
in psychology, Ui,l  is the motivation for choice (goal) l by agent i.  There is a distribution of 
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utilities across consumers.  Choice sets, Bi, differ among persons depending on their capacities.  
These capacities are determined by agent cognitive and personality traits as well as the usual 
time and material constraints.  In models with uncertainty, agents form expectations of constraint 
sets.  Agent i chooses iˆl  as the maximal element in the choice set Bi: 
 ,ˆ { }argmaxi i l
l Bi
l U
∈
= . 
Consider a familiar model which writes , , ,i l i l i lU V ε= + , where ,i lV  is agent i valuation for 
l and ,i lε is a random “taste” shock.  When Vi,l = Vl, and ,i lε is iid extreme value type 1, the 
probability that l is selected from choice set Bi is 
(8) 
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If agents have zero mean scale preference among the choices ( lV =0) so that all choices (goals) 
have the same mean utility, we obtain a version of Becker’s (1962) model of rational random 
behavior as extended by Sanderson (1974) where choices are generated by random shocks and 
the budget set determines choice behavior.    Under an iid assumption for preference shocks, all 
possible choices are equally likely.90   
Depending on how the constraints are determined, one can capture a variety of aspects of 
choice behaviour.  Thus a shy person may limit her options in a way an extravert does not.  An 
intelligent person may have a much richer choice set not only because of greater earnings 
capacity but also because of much greater imagination.  Much like greater pixel resolution in 
imaging machines, those with higher IQ may resolve reality in a more fine-grained and less 
biased way.  The negative relationship between IQ and risk aversion noted in section IV may be 
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due, in part, to the greater resolution of reality (removal of components of uncertainty) by the 
more intelligent. 91  We capture the effect of these traits on the choice sets, which may also 
depend on material endowments.  Applied to intertemporal settings, this framework captures the 
phenomenon of high time preference as an inability of an agent to imagine future states or as an 
inability to accurately measure future states.92,93 
B. Incorporating Personality and Cognitive Ability into Conventional Economic 
Models: A Simple Framework for Organizing the Evidence 
How should one incorporate psychological traits into conventional economic models?  
One could think of them as public goods, freely available to all activities or tasks undertaken by 
agents.  This is the approach implicitly adopted by most personality psychologists.  One could 
also think of psychological traits as excludable private goods.  More of a trait used in one activity 
means less of the trait available for use in other activities.   
In addition, one might augment, complement or override the supply of a trait to any 
activity by supplying more time, or energy, to the activity in which the trait is used.  Thus a trait 
that is a public good may be more evident in a given activity if more time or energy is allocated 
to the activity.  On the other hand, “energy,” e, which can be vector valued, may be used to 
moderate the manifestation of the trait (for example, energy may be spent controlling anger in a 
given activity).  Individuals differ in their endowment vector of the trait f  or in terms of the 
energy (possibly including time) denoted e .  Thus there may be a time constraint as in Becker 
(1965) or more generally there may be energy constraints (constraints on effort capacity). 
To develop these concepts and their consequences, we sketch a simple one-period model 
of consumer choice under certainty.  We consider models with uncertainty in the next subsection.  
The framework developed in this subsection is rich enough to make some useful distinctions.  
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Following Becker (1965), assume that there are 1J +  activities with outputs , 1,..., 1jZ j J= +  
undertaken by the agent.  We add one activity to account for market earnings.  jZ  is produced by 
combining tasks, jT , defined in section II, with purchased market goods, Xj.  We augment the 
task functions defined by equation (1) to include levels of energy, and time, in vector je : 
(9)    ( , ) 1,..., 1
j j
j jT h f e j J= = + . 
jf  is to be distinguished from jf , the j
th component of vector f .   There is a parallel notation 
for ej which may also be a vector valued (for example, time, energy).  Thus the first component 
of e, e1, could be time; the second component effort, and so on.  e1 is the amount of the vector 
allocated to the first task.  The more time or energy devoted to a task, the greater the output from 
the task.  For a fixed input of psychological traits, higher levels of e j may raise the output of the 
task.  It may also happen that unless a minimum amount of time or energy is devoted to a task, 
there is no productivity in the task.  Thus if je = 0, the trait jf may be switched off.  However, if 
some traits have negative productivity in some tasks more energy may be allocated to those tasks 
to offset the negative trait.  The effect of a trait in a task will depend on the bundle of other 
inputs used in the task.  It is necessary to identify these other inputs to identify the traits used in 
any activity.   
Output in activity jZ  is 
(10)    ( , ) 1,..., 1j j j jZ T X j Jϕ= = + .     
The outputs in activity j depend on the task output jT  and the goods input jX .  Agents have 
preferences over jZ  and e 
j.  The effort expended in an activity may have psychic costs or 
benefits.  There may be psychic costs in using e j to suppress the expression of a trait.  
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Preferences may also depend on f  as well as other variables which we keep implicit.  The utility 
function is 
(11)     
1 1
1( ,..., , ,..., , )
J
JU U Z Z e e f
+= .     
It captures the motivation of the agents for the outputs and “energy.”  As previously noted, 
personality psychologists do not typically study motivation.94  As embodied in utility functions, 
motivation is central to most economic models of choice.  Income is return on asset flow Y  plus 
labor earnings which we denote 1 1 1 1( , )J J J JZ T Xϕ+ + + += .  The budget constraint for goods is thus 
(12)     
1
1
1
J
j j J
j
P X Y Z
+
+
=
= +∑
.       
1JZ +  is a hedonic earnings function which prices out traits and energy in the market, and 
produces a flow of income.95   
It is possible to distinguish two different cases for f.  For psychological traits, we can 
distinguish the case where f  is a public good, jf f=  for all 1,..., 1j J= + , from the case where 
it is a private good, 
1
1
J
j
j
f f
+
=
=∑ .  In the former case, the same psychological traits enter as inputs 
into all tasks and activities.  In the latter case, the traits applied to different tasks are excludable 
and rivalrous. More traits applied in one activity means fewer traits in other activities.  People 
are not stuck with their personality in all activities.  Some components of f may be public and 
others private.  Thus extraversion and conscientiousness may be private goods that are more 
productive in some activities than others and the limited and divisible supply of these traits will 
be allocated according to preferences and productivity.  Openness to experience may be a public 
good.  One can classify all traits by this schema.  One could consider all possible combinations 
of public and private good possibilities for all of the traits.  For simplicity, we consider the pure 
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private goods case and the pure public goods case.  A similar distinction could be made for the 
energy inputs, but this seems less natural.  To focus on main cases, we assume that e is a private 
good.  Thus we analyze the two cases displayed in the table:  
 
  f 
  Public Private 
e Private I II 
 
In case I, the additional constraint operating on the consumer beyond the budget 
constraint (12) is 
(I)    
1
1
, ,
J
j j
j
f f e e
+
=
= =∑    for all j = 1,...,J+1. 
In case II, the operative constraints are 
(II)     
1 1
1 1
,
J J
j j
j j
f f e e
+ +
= =
= =∑ ∑
. 
a. Case I: Traits as Public Goods 
In case I, different bundles of f  across persons create comparative advantages for agents 
in different tasks and thus produce comparative advantages in different activities.  These 
endowments affect consumption patterns of agents and the derived demand for jX  through scale 
and complementary effects in the production of activities and through demand effects in 
preferences.  Case I is a version of Michael’s (1973) model of environmental variables in a 
household production framework.96 
 65
For analytical simplicity, suppose that jZ  and , 1,..., 1jT j J= + , display constant returns 
to scale in non-public inputs.  The assumption of constant returns neutralizes any scale effects in 
the determination of the shadow prices of tasks and activities.  Traits may have negative 
productivities.  Persons with higher levels of traits with negative productivity require the 
allocation of more energy and time to produce any given task.  Thus hot tempered people exert 
greater effort in controlling themselves in some activities.   
In terms of the technologies (9), when  f  is a public good, we assume constant returns to 
scale in je but that jf f=  is a fixed, environmental variable.  Different levels of f  produce 
different productivities in different tasks.  Feeding f  into the activity functions (10), which are 
also assumed to be constant returns to scale, we can analyze the agent’s problem of allocating 
effort among tasks and goods among activities using the analysis of Michael (1973).   Financial 
and energy resources are not changed by f  except for its effect on ZJ+1.  Holding energy and 
money resources fixed, changes in f  produce reallocations across budget categories. 
Thus if f  raises the productivity of inputs in task j, it reduces the shadow price of 
activity j.  This has the usual income and substitution effects.  The income effects produce a 
greater demand for all normal activities and sets in motion an increase in the derived demand for 
the inputs used in the activities.  Since in general f  appears as an input in multiple activities, 
increases in f  will set off a chain of substitution effects among the activities.  Depending on the 
preferences (motivations) over the Zj, j=1,...,J+1, demands for inputs may increase or decrease. 
It is instructive to reason through several cases.  Consider an increase in 
conscientiousness.  This will likely increase earnings (via ZJ+1), and will enhance productivity in 
some tasks intensive in conscientiousness and activities based on those tasks more than other 
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tasks and activities.  The increased income will support more of all activities.  The differential 
shift in productivity across tasks and activities will reduce the prices of activities that are more 
intensive in the use of conscientiousness.  If the demands for those activities are price elastic 
compared to the demands for the less conscientiousness-intensive activities, the demand for the 
inputs used in those activities will increase.  If the demands are relatively inelastic, the demands 
will decrease because of the greater productivity for the inputs. 
If a trait reduces productivity, the chain of logic just presented runs in reverse.  With 
increases in, for example, neuroticism, shadow prices of activities intensive in that trait will 
increase.  Labor earnings will tend to decrease.  In the price-elastic case, consumers will tend to 
substitute away from activities intensive in the trait and the demand for inputs will decrease.  In 
the inelastic case, input demands will increase as agents substitute goods and energy inputs into 
the activities that are inelastically demanded. 
The same level of the traits is found in all activities, but in general, energy or time will be 
allocated differentially among activities.  A person who allocates more energy or time to a task 
will manifest more of the trait.97  If inputs are complementary, at the same scale of output more 
of the task will be demanded.  Unless one controls for these inputs, one may fail to capture the 
uniformity of traits across tasks and activities.  In all of these cases, purchase patterns of market 
goods will provide information on endowments and allocation of energy and traits. 98 
b. Case II: Traits as Private Goods 
The case when traits are private goods produces the possibility of different levels of traits 
being used in different tasks and activities.  Responses of activity levels to changes in rewards 
across activities will be more price-elastic when traits can be allocated across activities than 
when traits are fixed.  Equiproportionate expansions in ( , )f e  differentially expand the 
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consumption possibility set for activities intensive in ( , )f e  and reduce their shadow prices, 
producing substitution effects in task production and activity consumption that promote 
consumption in activities intensive in the traits.  Because of the ability of agents to reallocate 
traits across tasks and activities, an increase in endowment produces a stronger effect on 
consumption of  f-intensive activities than in the public goods case.  This greater elasticity of 
response to endowment is a consequence of the LeChatelier Principle (Samuelson, 1947).  The 
public goods case imposes more constraints on the system than the private goods case.  
Compared to the case of public goods for traits, agents will reduce their allocation of the trait 
from activities where their productivity is negative and will spend less effort (e) in overriding the 
effects of negative traits in productivity.99  The trait will be shifted into less costly activities and 
less energy will be spent controlling it.100  In this case, in different tasks and activities, different 
traits will in general be observed.  This will produce a low correlation in traits across activities. 
The evidence summarized in sections IV and V of this paper would seem to favor case II, 
since different levels of traits are often found in different activities.  However, since most of the 
estimates reviewed in this paper do not adjust for the inputs that affect the manifestation of the 
traits, one must be cautious in reaching this conclusion.  Such adjustments are indicated by the 
theory but are not yet standard in economics or psychology.   
The roles of time and energy in amplifying or reducing the effects of the traits in 
activities needs to be systematically explored to make the theory empirically operational as are 
the effects of traits on the purchase of related goods (for example, shy people may seek to live in 
secluded areas, houses with high walls and seek jobs with little human contact).  In the private 
goods specification of the model (case II), the motivation for the supply of traits to different 
activities depends on preferences (utility rewards U), on productivity in jZ , and in productivity 
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in the tasks jT .  In this framework, it is possible to formalize many of the currently disparate 
concepts of personality psychology.  However, much more empirical research is required to 
make the framework just sketched operational.  It would be very informative to estimate both 
versions of the model and to test between them. 
We now turn to more general economic models with risk aversion, intertemporal choice, 
and investment.  For simplicity, we assume that personality, other psychological traits and 
energy are public goods.  The private goods version of the models follows from a direct 
application of analysis of this section. 
C. Integrating Psychology into More General Economic Models 
Economic theory at the single agent level separates two distinct aspects of behavior and 
decision making: preferences and constraints. Included among the constraints are (a) information 
acquisition constraints; (b) static budget constraints and endowments that affect the flow of 
resources available for consumption in any period; and (c) dynamic constraints connected with 
asset, skill and trait formation.  The constraints facing agents are also determined by available 
market arrangements and trading opportunities.  Psychology is potentially informative about all 
aspects of agent decision making.   
Preferences are central to conventional economic choice models.  In their most general 
form, we may write utility for an agent with decision horizon T over bundles of goods 
(attributes), Xt, t=1,...,T, in an environment of perfect certainty with cognitive and personality 
attributes f  as  
(13)     1( ,..., ; )TU X X f ,  
where it is assumed that U is neoclassical.101  At this level of generality, cognitive and 
personality traits can affect all aspects of choice for all goods including the valuation of leisure, 
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the intertemporal tradeoffs among goods, and risk aversion.  A general non-separable 
intertemporal preference function is consistent with substantial departures from standard utility 
theory such as hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak 1968; Ainslie 1991; Laibson 1998) and 
a variety of  “exotic” or nonstandard preferences as discussed in, for example, Backus, 
Routledge, and Zin (2005) and Hansen (2005).  Preference specifications (13) are consistent with 
different rates of time preference for different goods and across different periods as is found in 
the literature reviewed in Section IV.102   
Few economists would embrace the high level of generality of specification (13). Fruitful 
economic models are more tightly structured.  Specification (13) can characterize a one-shot 
model of lifetime decision making under certainty.  Agents choose their lifetime consumption 
bundles at the beginning of life and are fully committed to those choices.   
A basic problem with these specifications is time inconsistency.103  In open markets, 
persons are not committed to their initial desired choices. After period 1, there is ambiguity 
about the appropriate representation of the remaining lifecycle utility function.  One possibility is 
(13) with the first period choices as fixed arguments.  Then, agents will stick to the lifetime 
program they initially select.  Such an approach seems artificial because each period, people start 
anew and are free to make new decisions from a fresh time perspective.  However, compulsive 
personality types may stick to the same plans no matter what, as long as they are feasible.  Recall 
that compulsivity is one facet of the Big Five. 
More generally, agents may look at future decisions differently in period 2 than they did 
in period 1.  Let U t be the utility of the agent at stage t for the remainder of life 
( )  ,..., ;t t t TU G X X f= .  Without further restrictions, there is no reason why in period t, the 
agent is compelled to value the utilities of previous period consumption bundles or account for 
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past consumption behavior in the way done prior to period t in evaluating future consumption 
streams.  The problem of preferences changing over time is distinct from the problem of revised 
information sets although both produce possible departures from initial decisions based on 
(13).104  In both cases, decisions made in early periods affect resources available to later periods 
and, retrospectively, there may be regret about initial consumption choices.  Economists have 
traditionally addressed this problem by specializing (13).  The conventional specification of the 
general preference function (8) assumes a constant rate of discount ρ  for utility across periods:  
(14)            1 1
1
1( ,..., , ) ( , )
(1 )
T
T tt
t
U X X f U X fρ −== +∑ .  
Specification (14) is not required to achieve time consistency of choices.105  This is an 
important point, because there is a lot of evidence that speaks against (14) as previously noted in 
section IV.  Notice that (14) is just a special case of equation (13), which is also a standard 
model of economic preferences.  Discounting is implicit in specification (13), which generates 
goods-specific discounting that depends on future and past consumption choices, a phenomenon 
ruled out by (14).  A more general form of discounting than specification (14) that is consistent 
with (13) is  
(15) 1
1 2
1( ,..., , ) ( , )
1
tT
T t
t j j
U X X f U X fρ= =
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠∑∏ ,  
where discount rates may vary with age. Even more generally, both preferences and discount 
rates may vary with time-dependent variables (for example, children, health, mood, personality 
variables, and cognition).106  Following our analysis in section VI, factor f can evolve over time.   
Let ft denote personality and cognitive traits at age t.  We can use Ut (Xt, ft ) in place of 
U(Xt , f), allowing for personal traits to evolve over time, and we can allow for utility in period t 
itself to change, even after controlling for ft and Xt.  The analysis of Becker and Mulligan (1997) 
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and Mulligan (1997) models the evolution of the discount rate through investment decisions.  
Becker and Murphy (1988) model the evolution of preferences for addiction where ft is a stock of 
addictive capital. 
A wide variety of special cases of lifetime preferences are subsumed in specification (13).  
Personality factors like deliberation, future time perspective, and the capacity to inhibit impulses 
likely determine discount factors or preferences more generally.  So may aspects of cognitive 
ability.  Loewenstein et al. (2001) discuss how decisions are affected by moods and emotions, 
which are influenced by personality variables. There is some evidence that higher IQ persons 
have lower discount rates (see Frederick 2005 and Dohmen et al. 2007).  
The standard model of social interaction in economics is interaction through markets (See 
Arrow and Hahn 1971). More recently, economists have begun to analyze interactions in more 
general settings.  They consider interactions in learning, in workplace productivity and in 
consumption.107   
This aspect of human interaction is not captured by specifications (13)-(15) unless the tX  
include outcomes, choices or utilities of other persons.  As noted previously in section IV, a large 
literature in economics discusses the implications of altruism (see Becker, 1981 and Laferrère 
and Wolff, 2006, for a survey). Fehr and Gächter (2000) discuss the consequences of social 
preferences for economic decisions.  Models of social preferences have been developed by Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).  See the surveys by Fehr and Schmidt 
(2006) and Meier (2007).  One of the major findings of personality psychology noted in section 
V is that sociability, empathy, and the capacity to get along with others are important predictors 
of success in many activities.  These traits are not the same as altruism or social preferences, but 
 72
they are facets related to Big Five agreeableness and extraversion.  It would be useful to clarify 
the relationships among these measurements. 
Sociability and empathy may affect preferences for group activity which may be a source 
of pleasure (or displeasure) for some and which may also affect productivity in group activities 
in the workplace or in learning environments.  Dohmen et al. (2008) present evidence on how 
trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity relate to Big Five personality traits.  These 
and other personality traits play dual roles.  They are a source of pleasure and they can also be a 
source of productivity in certain contexts.  Agents making choices under any of the standard 
preference schemes, including those that recognize social interactions, are constrained in their 
information, the resources required to support consumption and in their ability to accumulate 
financial assets and skills.   
Uncertainty and risk are essential aspects of life. Economists have devoted much 
attention to the specification of the preferences of agents and the effect of uncertainty on choice 
(see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995).  Revisions of information sets over time are 
another reason why agents may deviate from initial choices apart from time inconsistency.   
Alternative specifications of information and preference are used in the literature.  
Individuals who are more intelligent or more open to experience (that is, more intellectually 
curious and motivated to learn) may acquire information more cheaply.  Other personality traits 
may affect the basic attribute spaces perceived by agents. 
The conventional model of uncertainty in economics is the expected utility model.  Break 
X into values that occur in different states s=1,...,St, 11 1 1( , , , , )ts SX X XK K . Expected utility 
represents preferences by  
 , ,
1 1
( ) ( ),
tST
t s t s
t s
U X P U X
= =
= ∑∑  where ,
1
1
tS
t s
s
P
=
=∑ , 1,...,t T=  
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where Xt,s is a state s, time t-specific bundle of traits and ,t sP  is the probability that state s occurs 
in period t.  
There is considerable empirical evidence against this model. Many departures from it 
have been proposed to rationalize the available evidence.108  Some departures break the additive 
separability assumption and assume a variety of alternative preference structures.  A more 
general specification is based on (13) or its “exotic preference” specializations augmented to 
include as arguments different states of nature at each time period (Xt,s) and probability 
distributions over these states of nature.  These models allow for much richer specifications of 
the information sets on which agents act than is permitted in the expected utility model.  
Personality factors may affect the arrival and processing of information. People not open 
to experience fail to learn from it. Impulsive people who do not act with deliberation may 
process information inefficiently (Frederick 2005). Persons with greater ability to imagine the 
future or imagine outcomes reduce the intrinsic uncertainty in their environments and may be 
less risk averse, or more risk averse, depending on whether the imagined outcome is more 
favorable or less favorable. Personality traits affect openness to experience (willingness to learn), 
risk aversion (anxiety), and imagination about future states not yet experienced (creativity).  
Persons with higher IQs appear to be more willing to take risks and are more patient (Dohmen et 
al. 2007), perhaps because they are better able to envision future consequences.  
There are far richer models of decision making under uncertainty in economics than the 
standard expected utility model or models based on decision making under uncertainty generated 
from objective distributions.  These specifications allow for preferences over the temporal 
resolution of uncertainty about states of the world (Kreps and Porteus 1978; Epstein and Zin 
1991), uncertainty about distributions over states of the world (ambiguity) and different types of 
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risk and uncertainty aversion in preferences (see Starmer 2000). These models enrich 
conventional economic theory by taking into consideration how agents react to uncertain events 
and how they process information.109 These richer theories of decision making under uncertainty 
expand the scope for introducing personality variables into economics.110   
Personality traits are likely to prove useful in economic models of decision making under 
ambiguity.111  Individuals may differ in their capacities to deal with poorly defined situations.  
Greater intelligence may help define situations, but person with greater self control, openness to 
experience, lower levels of anxiety and those who seek excitement may better cope with 
ambiguity.  
Personality traits may also affect the resources available to agents. As emphasized by 
Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001), certain personality and character traits may be more highly 
valued than others in the labor market (trustworthiness, perseverance, outgoingness, for 
example).  Borghans, ter Weel and Weinberg (2006) show that technological and organizational 
changes have increased the importance of people skills in the workplace. They present evidence 
for Germany and the United States that the increased importance of people skills has affected the 
labor-market outcomes of blacks and women. They find that the relative employment of women 
is higher in occupations in which people tasks are more important in Britain, Germany and the 
United States. The reverse is true for racial, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic minorities in the 
United States. They also show that the rapid increase in the importance of people tasks over this 
time period helps explain the increase in women’s wages relative to men and the stagnation in 
wages of black workers relative to white workers.  Diligent or trustworthy employees require 
less supervision.  More generally, different personality and cognitive traits may be more highly 
valued in some activities than in others.  In any activity, whether it is learning, information 
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processing or performance of a workplace task, those who exert higher levels of effort will be 
more productive. 
Comparative advantage in the labor market is analyzed in the models of Roy (1951), 
Mandelbrot (1961, 1962), Tinbergen (1956), Rosen (1974), Sattinger (1979, 1993), Willis and 
Rosen (1979), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), and Teulings (1995; 2005).  Borghans, ter Weel, 
and Weinberg (2007) develop a model in which personality traits are included in an assignment 
model.  Write the productivity of a person in occupation (pursuit) j at time t as , , ( , )
j j
j t j t t tY f eα= , 
j=1,..., tJ , where we adjoin t subscripts to the trait and energy levels.  Different occupations or 
tasks require (or weight) different traits differently. (See Hogan, 2005, and Hogan and Hogan, 
2007.)  Thus, for example, extraversion is an essential trait for a salesman but not a lighthouse 
keeper or a truck driver.  An individual who tries harder at any task will typically be more 
productive, although in certain workplace norms that enforce effort standards, the loner who 
makes more effort may be less productive, at least in terms of group cohesiveness.112   
In subsection B, we analyzed specifications of market productivity functions that are used 
in the efficiency wage literature (see Weiss 1991).   Market output depends on psychological 
traits plus effort and energy.  Agents operating under different incentive schemes will manifest 
different effort.  More generally, as noted in subsection B and section IV, the expression or 
manifestation of personality traits will depend, in part, on the context in which the individual is 
placed.  At issue is the situational specificity of personality traits.     
If agents choose or are assigned to tasks on the basis of maximal output Yj,t and pursuit of 
one occupation precludes pursuit of other occupations, the occupation (task) selected at time t 
among the tJ  possible assignments at time t is 
*
tj , defined as 
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(16)         { }* , 1arg max t
t
J
t j t tj
j Y == .  
In this case, *,  ti jY corresponds to ZJ+1,t for the period t as introduced in subsection C.  This 
framework captures the notion of comparative advantage in the labor market where agents sort 
into sectors based on their comparative productivity.  Productivity determined by skills and 
personality traits affects the bundle of goods that the agent can buy.  The phenomena of 
comparative advantage and differential skill requirements in different tasks helps to explain why 
some personality traits are predictive in certain activities but not in others (for evidence see 
Hogan, Hogan, and Roberts 1996).  Hogan (2005) and Hogan and Hogan (2007) show the 
predictive power of personality traits in different occupations.  Different employers may place 
different weights on different characteristics, and they may have different values in different 
settings.113 
Over time, persons may also accumulate assets and skills, and may change their 
personality characteristics and cognitive traits.  Preference parameters affect asset and skill 
accumulation.  In section VI, we presented evidence that cognitive and personality traits can be 
changed (see Cunha and Heckman 2007 and Fraley and Roberts 2005). Both are influenced by 
experience and current stocks of the characteristics and other determinants.  To formalize these 
notions, define Ct as a capacity vector that includes ft and et but encompasses a wider notion of 
capacities.  Motivation can be affected by intelligence and other capacities of human beings (see 
Cunha and Heckman 2008).  Interventions can affect preferences, information, opportunity sets, 
and the formation of skills and preferences.  Personality and cognitive ability evolve over time 
through investment, through learning by doing or through other life experiences (see Cunha and 
Heckman 2007; Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2007). Among the characteristics or capacities 
Ct can be health, motivation, personality traits and ability (Heckman 2007).  Using the 
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technology of skill formation developed by Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2008), capacities evolve 
via the following recursive technology 
(17)    1 ( , ),t t tC C INτ+ =  1, , 1,t T= −K 0 0C c=    
where c0 is an initial condition for capacities and tIN  is investment at stage t and where τ  is 
concave in tIN , and is assumed to be differentiable in tC  and tIN . In one version of this theory, 
tf = tC  and cognitive and personality skills can evolve over time.
114  Characteristics may be self-
productive ( , ) 0t t
t
C IN
C
τ⎛ ⎞∂ >⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠ .  Investment, which can include experience and other inputs, may 
affect the evolution of abilities and personality, that is, ( , ) 0t t
t
C IN
IN
τ⎛ ⎞∂ >⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠ .   
D. Linking Preference and Constraint Parameters to Psychological Variables 
It is tempting to relate the personality traits in Table 1 to conventional economic 
preference parameters.  This task is complicated by the fact that Table 1 omits cognition. We 
previously cited evidence relating IQ to risk preference and time preference.  In this subsection, 
we speculate about the relationship between personality measures and conventional preference 
parameters.  It is an area ripe for future research and our comments are designed to foster it.  
The Big Five captures traits that seem relevant but are not exclusive determinants of 
economic preference parameters.  Moreover, a single agent economic model cannot fully capture 
the operation of traits that foster social interactions.  Positive social interactions can produce 
benefits in terms of learning and information processing.  Participation in social groups provides 
a form of insurance and may promote risk taking (through insurance), even if it does not change 
risk aversion.  Many economic models of contracting emphasize unobserved effort (a component 
of e), as an important dimension of economic transactions in the presence of imperfect 
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information (see Salanié 1997).  Empirical work in contract theory would be facilitated if 
preference parameters could be extracted from psychological questionnaires that predict effort.   
For the same time input, some individuals may put in more effort in a task (a component 
of Tj, j=1,...,J+1 ) and will be more productive than other individuals at the task whether the task 
is a job, learning in school or acquiring information.  Persons for whom the utility cost of effort 
is low, and hence exert more effort, will be more productive in a variety of activities.  Moreover, 
effort or energy levels (and other personality traits) can be affected by incentives confronting 
agents.  Thus, behavior is affected by incentives and is not necessarily constant across settings. 
In Table 1, “warmth” (a facet under extraversion) may be a productive trait in some 
settings, but it may be unproductive in certain settings (for example, an assembly line, on the 
battlefield or in a seminar). Fantasy (under Openness) can be counterproductive in routine tasks 
but very productive in creative work, providing that the person is also self-disciplined and open 
to criticism.  There is wisdom in considering traits that have domain-specific productivities.  
Such productivities are associated with comparative advantage in the labor market.  In addition, 
different incentives and monitoring schemes can produce different behaviors (the measures in 
equation (3) for the same person placed in different settings, for example). 
Do the traits discussed by personality psychology cause us to rethink the standard 
economic model?  The evidence on the predictive power of sociability, effort and 
conscientiousness and the evidence on altruism and other pro-social preferences should lead to a 
reemphasis of traditional theory.  Social interactions tend to be neglected in standard economic 
theory, although there is a lot of recent research on this topic (see Durlauf and Young 2001, 
Brock and Durlauf 2001, and the evidence in Fehr and Schimdt, 2006).     
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Is it possible that conventional economic preference parameters fully explain all of the 
personality traits uncovered by psychologists? It seems implausible that conventional leisure 
preference, risk aversion, and time preference parameters explain all of the traits identified in 
Table 1.  For one thing, it is likely that these parameters are produced both by cognition and 
personality as we have previously noted.  However, certain traits associated with Big Five 
conscientiousness might be rationalized by basic preference parameters.  A low taste for leisure 
and a low discount rate would contribute to making persons more conscientious.  However, the 
Big Five traits alone cannot explain diligence unless the person has some goal (or goals) or 
preferences motivating effort and self-discipline in a particular situation.  Conventional 
economic models do not explain the origin of motives (goals).  Most of the traits in Table 1 (for 
example, hostility, warmth, anxiety, trust) are less easily explained by standard economic 
preferences.  
 
VIII. Summary and Suggestions for Future Research 
Whereas the significance of personality traits for success in many aspects of life has long 
been appreciated at an intuitive level, it was not until recently that a substantial body of empirical 
analysis has documented this intuition. However, recognizing the importance of traits other than 
intelligence is not enough. It is also essential to identify which traits are important for which 
outcomes. Such an understanding not only leads to better measures and richer models, but 
ultimately provides direction for policy and intervention. Economists are not alone in their 
interest in the description, prediction, and explanation of human behavior. Psychologists, too, 
have approached these challenges. Economists can profitably leverage research from psychology 
 80
on the measurement, prediction, and malleability of personality traits organized in the widely-
accepted Big Five taxonomy.  
We summarize this paper by collecting our responses to the questions posed in the 
introduction. 
1. Cognitive and personality traits are conceptually distinct if one defines cognitive 
traits to mean general intelligence and specific cognitive abilities. Aspects of personality—
shyness, sociability, time preference, impulsivity, extraversion, agreeableness, empathy, sense of 
humor, and so on—involve cognitive processes but can be separated from raw problem solving 
abilities for abstract problems. 
2. Distinguishing cognitive and personality traits empirically is a difficult task. 
Measurements of IQ and achievement are affected not only by the knowledge of the test taker, 
but also by their motivation. Responses on self-report personality questionnaires are affected by 
strategic responses of the persons being examined which depend, in part, on their perceptions of 
gain from a response and hence their basic intelligence.  Econometric methods have been 
developed to isolate “pure” intelligence and personality from the effects of environment and 
experience and to account for measurement error.  Their application will enable both 
psychologists and economists to isolate relevant psychological traits as well as test among 
competing specifications of how personality traits should enter economic models. 
3. We distinguish a priori definitions of personality traits constructed using factor 
analyses from predictive definitions.  Definitions of personality traits based on internal 
consistency of clusters of test scores are widely used in personality psychology.  The tests used 
in these exercises are devised on a priori grounds to “tap” certain trait spaces that are intuited to 
be important.  Clusters of traits arrived at through factor analysis are less appealing than 
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definitions based on the predictive power of tests in real world settings.  Each approach has its 
limitations. 
4. The concordance between the measures of personality psychology and the 
parameters of economic theory is far from perfect.  Personality psychology instructs us that 
many traits, even those beyond altruism and social preferences, are important factors that should 
be given more emphasis in the economic theory of preferences and constraints.  Motivation and 
effort deserve a renewed emphasis applied to broader aspects of social life than just the labor 
market.  Economists explicitly model motivation through preferences.  The evidence suggests 
that performance on tests can be affected by incentives but only for certain personality types.   
Economists have long emphasized that organizations can succeed by aligning the interests of the 
workers with those of managers.  This can be achieved by selecting persons with compatible 
personality traits (for example, on the basis of trustworthiness, cooperativeness, and the like) or 
by giving incentives to workers of each personality type or by a mixture of the two strategies.  
However, implementing both types of strategies in the same workplace may be 
counterproductive because of envy and other social effects. 
While the lessons from personality psychology are provocative, they have not yet 
changed the way most economists go about their business.  Recent attacks by psychologists on 
conventional preference specifications in economics have not been productive because the straw 
men attacked – expected utility and additively separable models for intertemporal choice – have 
long been abandoned by economists at the frontier of knowledge.  What is needed are more 
focused studies that suggest specific generalizations of standard models that are empirically 
fruitful for a range of questions and that have empirical content.  Both preferences and 
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constraints should be analyzed.  Implementing the simple models presented in section VII would 
be a good first start. 
An example of how economic theory can be changed in a fundamental way by learning 
lessons from personality psychology is the recent work on multidimensional screening that adds 
personality skills to traditional screening and signaling models and produces a fundamental 
reformulation of signaling theory (Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira, 2007).  
5. Many economists and psychologists assume that preference and personality 
parameters are fixed early in life.  The evidence suggests otherwise.  Both cognitive and 
personality traits evolve, albeit at different rates at different ages.  Rank-order stability of 
cognitive skills emerges much earlier than rank-order stability of personality skills.  Recent 
research shows how cognitive and personality skills are affected by parental investments and life 
experiences.  While an assumption of complete stability is analytically convenient, it is not found 
in the data.  Evidence of change in preferences suggests that consistent life cycle planning may 
be difficult.  Agents may, or may not, know if their future preferences will be like their current 
preferences.   
In addition, many psychological measurement schemes assume that the persons being 
assessed face common choice environments.  Our analysis shows that contexts and incentives 
affect manifest personality traits (effort, for example) and may also affect self-reported traits.  
This point has important lessons for the measurement and interpretation of personality traits that 
have not yet made their way into psychological or economic survey-based schemes.  It would be 
very informative to measure personality and cognitive traits under a broader array of different 
incentive arrangements than have been explored to date, and to benchmark measurements of 
personality and preference traits at common baselines and tools exist to make these adjustments. 
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There is a lot of room for cooperation and exchange of findings and methods between 
personality psychology and economics.  We conclude by suggesting some avenues for future 
research. 
I. Economic preference measures should be subject to the same psychometric 
standards as personality measures. These include: evidence of internal reliability, test-retest 
stability (over short periods), convergent validity, discriminant validity, and predictive validity. 
Subjecting economic preference measures to these standards will increase their validity and 
improve their ability to predict outcomes.  At the same time, psychologists should better 
recognize that the contexts and incentives faced by agents affect measurements of both cognitive 
and personality traits.  
II. Economic preferences are likely multidimensional. Time preference, for example, 
may have different components (for example, the inability to inhibit an impulse, the tendency not 
to consider or imagine the future, comfort with ambiguity, and the like). A hierarchical view (as 
there is for IQ) may organize a large, currently disorganized literature and unite inconsistent 
findings across studies and low intercorrelations among measures in a given study.  In addition, 
recognition that certain traits may be allocated differently across tasks, and adjusting for this, 
will likely improve consistency of the evidence across studies.   
III. Econometric methods that account for measurement error and that anchor 
measurements in real world behavior hold substantial promise in both fields.  Econometric 
methods can move the study of personality and its effects from purely predictive analyses to 
causal models.  Econometric methods also hold promise in modeling the formation and evolution 
of traits over the life cycle. 
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IV. New studies should incorporate validated personality, IQ, and preference 
measures, as well as outcome measures.  Prospective, longitudinal designs are best suited to this 
task.   They should measure volatility of traits at a given age (depending on contexts and 
incentives faced by agents) as well as the effects of experience on the evolution of personality.  
An open question, not fully addressed in this paper, is the situational and cultural specificity of 
personality measures. More careful measurements are required to resolve this issue.  The 
evidence presented here is consistent with stability of traits with age but not their constancy.  At 
a point in time, incentives and situations affect levels of performance, but personality is not 
entirely situation-specific. 
V. A topic not addressed in this paper but important for future work is the relation of 
cognitive and personality traits to neural substrates and biological factors.115  Such a mapping 
would establish a firm basis for distinguishing among these classes of traits, and also clarify 
distinctions among personality traits.  The evidence assembled thus far suggests that the 
executive function is localized to the prefrontal cortex and its afferent and efferent connections 
(Miller and Cohen, 2001). Fear is localized to the amygdala (Calder, Lawrence, and Young, 
2001).  Recently, the interest of neuroscientists has been extended to time preference (Glimcher, 
Kable, and Louie, 2007; McClure et al., 2004).  
While much remains to be discovered, the evidence presented here suggests that the 
systematic empirical and theoretical study of personality is likely to be very fruitful for 
economics.  Personality traits are predictive of socioeconomic success.  They can be influenced 
by interventions and investment more readily than IQ, at least after the early years.  A deeper 
understanding of personality traits promises to enrich economic theory and to understand the 
sources of, and solutions for, human inequality. 
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Figure 1 
 
Perry Preschool Program: IQ, by Age and Treatment Group 
 
IQ measured on the Stanford Binet Intelligence Scale (Terman and Merrill, 1960).  Test 
was administered at program entry and each of the ages indicated.  Source: Heckman and 
Masterov (2007). 
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Figure 2 
Competing taxonomies of personality 
Note: Figure reproduced from Bouchard and Loehlin (2001), with kind permission from 
Springer Science and Business Media. 
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Table 1 
 
The Big Five domains and their facets 
 
Factor Facets Definition of 
Factor 
ACLa Marker 
Items for Factor 
I. Openness to Experience 
(Intellect) 
Fantasy, 
Aesthetics, 
Feelings, 
Actions, 
Ideas, 
Values 
The degree to 
which a person 
needs intellectual 
stimulation, 
change, and 
variety. 
Commonplace, 
Narrow-interest, 
Simple- vs. 
Wide-interest, 
Imaginative, 
Intelligent 
II. Conscientiousness Competence, 
Order, 
Dutifulness, 
Achievement 
striving, 
Self-discipline, 
Deliberation 
The degree to 
which a person is 
willing to comply 
with conventional 
rules, norms, and 
standards. 
Careless, 
Disorderly, 
Frivolous vs. 
Organized, 
Thorough, 
Precise 
 
III. Extraversion Warmth, 
Gregariousness, 
Assertiveness, 
Activity, 
Excitement 
seeking, 
Positive emotions 
The degree to 
which a person 
needs attention 
and social 
interaction. 
Quiet, 
Reserved, Shy 
vs. Talkative, 
Assertive, 
Active 
 
IV. Agreeableness Trust, 
Straight-
forwardness, 
Altruism, 
Compliance, 
Modesty, 
Tender-mindedness 
The degree to 
which a person 
needs pleasant 
and harmonious 
relations with 
others. 
Fault-finding, 
Cold, 
Unfriendly vs. 
Sympathetic, 
Kind, Friendly 
 
V. Neuroticism (Emotional 
Stability) 
Anxiety, 
Angry hostility, 
Depression, 
Self-consciousness, 
Impulsiveness, 
Vulnerability 
The degree to 
which a person 
experiences the 
world as 
threatening and 
beyond his/her 
control. 
Tense, Anxious, 
Nervous vs. 
Stable, Calm, 
Contented 
 
Source: Hogan and Hogan (2007) 
Note: a. ACL = Adjective Check List (Gough and Heilbrun, 1983) 
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Table 2 
 
Incentives and Performance on Intelligence Tests  
 
 
Study Sample and 
Study Design 
Experimental 
Group 
Effect size of 
incentive (in 
standard 
deviations) 
Summary 
Edlund 
(1972) 
Between 
subjects study. 
11 matched 
pairs of low 
SES children; 
children were 
about one 
standard 
deviation 
below average 
in IQ at 
baseline  
M&M candies 
given for each 
right answer 
Experimental group 
scored 12 points 
higher than control 
group during a 
second testing on an 
alternative form of 
the Stanford Binet 
(about .eight 
standard deviations) 
“…a carefully chosen 
consequence, candy, 
given contingent on 
each occurrence of 
correct responses to an 
IQ test, can result in a 
significantly higher IQ 
score.”(p. 319) 
Ayllon & 
Kelly 
(1972) 
Sample 1 
Within subjects 
study. 12 
mentally 
retarded 
children (avg 
IQ 46.8) 
Tokens given in 
experimental 
condition for 
right answers 
exchangeable for 
prizes 
6.25 points out of a 
possible 51 points 
on Metropolitan 
Readiness Test. t = 
4.03 
Ayllon & 
Kelly 
(1972) 
Sample 2 
Within subjects 
study 34 urban 
fourth graders 
(avg IQ = 92.8) 
Tokens given in 
experimental 
condition for 
right answers 
exchangeable for 
prizes 
t = 5.9 
Ayllon & 
Kelly 
(1972) 
Sample 3 
Within subjects 
study of 12 
matched pairs 
of mentally 
retarded 
children 
Six weeks of 
token 
reinforcement 
for good 
academic 
performance 
Experimental group 
scored 3.67 points 
out of possible 51 
points on a post-test 
given under 
standard conditions 
higher than at 
baseline; control 
group dropped 2.75 
points. On a second 
post-test with 
incentives, exp and 
control groups 
“…test scores often 
reflect poor academic 
skills, but they may 
also reflect lack of 
motivation to do well 
in the criterion 
test…These results, 
obtained from both a 
population typically 
limited in skills and 
ability as well as from 
a group of normal 
children (Experiment 
II), demonstrate that 
the use of 
reinforcement 
procedures applied to 
a behavior that is 
tacitly regarded as “at 
its peak” can 
significantly alter the 
level of performance 
of that behavior.” (p. 
483) 
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increased 6.25 and 
7.17 points, 
respectively 
Clingman 
and Fowler 
(1976) 
Within subjects 
study of 72 
first- and 
second-graders 
assigned 
randomly to 
contingent 
reward, 
noncontingent 
reward, or no 
reward 
conditions. 
M&Ms given for 
right answers in 
contingent cdtn; 
M&Ms given 
regardless of 
correctness in 
noncontingent 
condition 
Only among low-IQ 
(<100) subjects was 
there an effect of 
the incentive. 
Contingent reward 
group scored about 
.33 standard 
deviations higher on 
the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary test 
than did no reward 
group.  
“…contingent candy 
increased the I.Q. 
scores of only the ‘low 
I.Q.’ children. This 
result suggests that the 
high and medium I.Q. 
groups were already 
functioning at a higher 
motivational level than 
children in the low 
I.Q. group.” 
Zigler and 
Butterfield 
(1968) 
Within and 
between 
subjects study 
of 40 low SES 
children who 
did or did not 
attend nursery 
school were 
tested at the 
beginning and 
end of the year 
on Stanford-
Binet 
Intelligence 
Test under 
either 
optimized or 
standard 
conditions. 
Motivation was 
optimized 
without giving 
test-relevant 
information. 
Gentle 
encouragement, 
easier items after 
items were 
missed, and so 
on. 
At baseline (in the 
fall), there was a 
full standard 
deviation difference 
(10.6 points and SD 
was about 9.5 in 
this sample) 
between scores of 
children in the 
optimized vs 
standardconditions 
The nursery group 
improved their 
scores, but only in 
the standard 
condition. 
“…performance on an 
intelligence test is best 
conceptualized as 
reflecting three distinct 
factors: (a) formal 
cognitive processes; 
(b) informational 
achievements which 
reflect the content 
rather than the formal 
properties of 
cognition, and (c) 
motivational factors 
which involve a wide 
range of personality 
variables. (p. 2)  
“…the significant 
difference in 
improvement in 
standard IQ 
performance found 
between the nursery 
and non-nursery 
groups was 
attributable solely to 
motivational 
factors…” (p. 10) 
Breuning 
and Zella 
(1978) 
Within and 
between 
subjects study 
of 485 special 
Incentives such 
as record 
albums, radios 
(<$25) given for 
Scores increased by 
about 17 points. 
Results were 
consistent across the 
“In summary, the 
promise of 
individualized 
incentives on an 
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education high 
school students 
all took IQ 
tests, then were 
randomly 
assigned to 
control or 
incentive 
groups to 
retake tests. 
Subjects were 
below-average 
in IQ. 
improvement in 
test performance 
Otis-Lennon, 
WISC-R, and 
Lorge-Thorndike 
tests. 
increase in IQ test 
performance (as 
compared with pretest 
performance) resulted 
in an approximate 17-
point increase in IQ 
test scores. These 
increases were equally 
spread across subtests 
The incentive 
condition effects were 
much less pronounced 
for students have 
pretest IQs between 98 
and 120 and did not 
occur for students 
having pretest IQs 
between 121 and 140.” 
(p. 225) 
Holt and 
Hobbs 
(1979) 
Between and 
within subjects 
study of 80 
delinquent 
boys randomly 
assigned to 
three 
experimental 
groups and one 
control group. 
Each exp group 
received a 
standard and 
modified 
administration 
of the WISC-
verbal section. 
Exp 1-Token 
reinforcement 
for correct 
responses; Exp 2 
– Tokens 
forfeited for 
incorrect 
responses 
(punishment), 
Exp 3-feedback 
on 
correct/incorrect 
responses 
1.06 standard 
deviation difference 
between the token 
reinforcement and 
control groups 
(inferred from t = 
3.31 for 39 degrees 
of freedom0 
“Knowledge of results 
does not appear to be a 
sufficient incentive to 
significantly improve 
test performance 
among below-average 
I.Q. 
subjects…Immediate 
rewards or response 
cost may be more 
effective with below-
average I.Q. subjects 
while other conditions 
may be more effective 
with average or above-
average subjects.” (p. 
83) 
Larson, 
Saccuzzo, 
and Brown 
(1994) 
Between 
subjects study 
of 109 San 
Diego State 
University 
psychology 
students 
Up to $20 for 
improvement 
over baseline 
performance on 
cognitive speed 
tests  
“While both groups 
improved with 
practice, the 
incentive group 
improved slightly 
more.” Æ need to 
calculate effect size, 
but it was not large 
2 reasons why 
incentive did not 
produce dramatic 
increase: 1) few or no 
unmotivated subjects 
among college 
volunteers, 2) 
information processing 
tasks are too simple 
for ‘trying harder’ to 
139 
matter 
Duckworth 
(2007) 
Within subjects 
study of 61 
urban low-
achieving high 
school students 
tested with a 
group-
administered 
Otis-Lennon 
IQ test during 
their freshman 
year, then 
again 2 years 
later with a 
one-on-one 
(WASI) test 
Standard 
directions for 
encouraging 
effort were 
followed for the 
WASI brief test. 
Performance was 
expected to be 
higher because 
of the one-on-
one 
environment. 
Performance on the 
WASI as juniors 
was about 16 points 
higher than on the 
group-administered 
test as freshmen. 
Notably, on the 
WASI, this 
population looks 
almost “average” in 
IQ, whereas by 
Otis-Lennon 
standards they are 
low IQ. t (60) = 
10.67, p < .001 
The increase in IQ 
scores could be 
attributed to any 
combination of the 
following 1) an 
increase in “g” due to 
schooling at an 
intensive charter 
school, 2) an increase 
in knowledge or 
crystallized 
intelligence, 3) an 
increase in motivation 
due to the change in 
IQ test format, and/or 
4) an increase in 
motivation due to 
experience at high 
performing school 
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Figure 3 
Predictive Validities IQ and Big Five Dimensions  
Note: Details on the Measures of Outcomes for Figure 1 of the Web Appendix are 
available in Web Appendix D 
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Figure 4a  
Cumulative mean-level changes in personality across the life course 
Note: Figure taken from Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer (2006). Reprinted with 
permission of the authors. Social vitality and social dominance are aspects of Big Five 
extraversion. Cumulative d values represent total lifetime change in standard deviations.
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Figure 4b 
Longitudinal analysis (top panel) and cross-sectional analysis (bottom panel) of mean-
level change in cognitive skills over the lifespan 
Note: T-scores on the y-axis are standardized scores with a mean of 50 and a standard 
deviation of ten. Figures taken from Schaie (1994). Used with permission of the publisher. 
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Figure 4c  
Fluid intelligence decreases and crystallized intelligence increases across the lifespan 
Note: Figure from Horn (1970). Used with permission of Elsevier. 
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Figure 5a 
Note: Figure taken from Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) meta-analysis and reflects test-
retest correlations over, on average, 6.7-year periods. Reprinted with permission of the authors. 
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Figure 5b 
Note: Figure reproduced from Hopkins and Bracht (1975), and reflects ten-year, test-retest 
correlations over ten-year intervals. Grade level, not age, is on the x-axis. Used with permission 
of the publisher. 
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Endnotes 
1 See, for example, Gottfredson (2002), Herrnstein and Murray (1994), and Heckman, Urzua, 
and Stixrud (2006). 
2 The American Psychological Association Dictionary defines cognition as “all forms of 
knowing and awareness such as perceiving, concerning, remembering, reasoning, judging, 
imagining, and problem solving.” 
3 See Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne, 2001, for a review.  Among other determinants of earnings, 
they summarize evidence on the labor market effects of beauty by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) 
and Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang (2002).  Marxist economists (Bowles and Gintis, 1976) 
pioneered the analysis of the impact of personality on earnings.  Mueser (1979) estimates 
empirical relationships between personality traits and earnings.  Mueller and Plug (2006) relate 
the Big Five personality factors to earnings.  Hartog (1980, 2001) draws on the psychology 
literature to analyze economic preferences.  van Praag (1985) and van Praag and van Weeren 
(1988) also link economics with psychology. 
4 See Schweinhart et. al (2005); Cunha et al. (2006), and Heckman et al. (2007). 
5 Some psychologists believe that expectation, motivation, goals, values, and interests fall 
outside the construct of personality.  Others take the position that insofar as these variables are 
persistent over time, they can be considered aspects of personality (see Costa and McCrae 1988). 
Broadly speaking, the field of personality and individual differences psychology is concerned 
with all dimensions on which people differ from one another.  For a discussion of vocational 
interests, their measurement, and their theoretical relationship to personality traits, we direct the 
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reader to Holland (1986), Larson, Rottinghaus, and Borgen (2002), and Low and Rounds (2006).  
McAdams (2006) and McAdams and Pals (2007) present a more comprehensive view of 
personality psychology including basic drives and motivations. 
6 Large-scale longitudinal studies linking motivation to economic outcomes are rare. Duncan 
and Dunifon (1998) provide the best available evidence that individual differences in motivation 
measured in young adulthood predict labor market outcomes more than a decade later.  However, 
they do not correct for the problem of reverse causality discussed below.  As Cunha and 
Heckman (2007, 2008) show, young adults can predict over half of their future earnings.  The 
Duncan and Dunifon motivation measure may be a consequence of agent expectations of future 
benefits rather than a cause of the future benefits. 
7 Investment refers to the allocation of resources, broadly defined, for the purpose of increasing 
skills. Parents invest in their children directly and through choice of schools, but individuals can 
also invest in themselves. 
8 Many theories of personality are cognitively-oriented.  For example, Mischel (1968) and 
Bandura (1999) suggest that behavior is driven by cognitive operations, beliefs, and 
representations of reality (how people process information, what they believe to be true, and how 
they interpret their perceptions). 
9 The Ui,j can include measurement errors. 
10 The strength of the correlation depends on the magnitudes of λj, λj’ across the two tasks. 
11 Several psychologists have attempted to broaden the term intelligence to include other 
capacities. Most notably, Sternberg (2000, 2001) suggests that the notion of intelligence should 
also include creativity and the ability to solve practical, real-world problems. Gardner (2004) 
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includes in his theory of multiple intelligences, musical intelligence, kinaesthetic intelligence, 
and interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence, among others. 
12 Carroll (1993) analyzed 477 data sets and estimated a structure with g as the highest-order 
factor, eight second-order ability clusters, and many over 70 more narrowly defined third-order 
abilities on a variety of different tests.  Alternative hierarchical models, also with g as the 
highest-order factor, have been proposed (for example, Cattell 1971; Lubinski 2004). 
13 Cattell’s student Horn (1970) elaborates: fluid intelligence is the ability to “perceive complex 
relations, educe complex correlates, form concepts, develop aids, reason, abstract, and maintain 
span of immediate apprehension in solving novel problems in which advanced elements of the 
collective intelligence of the culture were not required for solution” (p. 462). In contrast, 
crystallized intelligence is the same class of skills, “but in materials in which past appropriation 
of the collective intelligence of the culture would give one a distinct advantage in solving the 
problems involved” (p. 462). 
14 Rindermann (2007) uses data on intelligence and achievement tests across nations to show 
that a single factor accounts for 94-95 percent of the variance across both kinds of tests. The high 
correlation between intelligence and achievement tests is in part due to the fact that both require 
cognitive ability and knowledge, even if to different degrees, that common developmental factors 
may affect both of these traits, and that fluid intelligence promotes the acquisition of crystallized 
intelligence. 
15 Recent research by Conti and Pudney (2007) shows that more than one factor is required to 
summarize the predictive power of cognitive tests in economic data.  This could be due to the 
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existence of multiple intellective factors or because personality factors affect the measurement of 
cognitive factors as we discuss later on in this section.   
16 Executive function has been characterized as the capacity to act on information as opposed to 
understanding the information. In the language of psychology, executive function refers to “the 
multi-operational system mediated by prefrontal areas of the brain and their reciprocal cortical 
and subcortical connecting pathways” (Ardila, Pineda, and Rosselli 2000; see Miller and Cohen 
2001, for a review). Alvarez and Emory (2006) review evidence that involvement of the frontal 
lobes is necessary but not sufficient for performance on executive function; for any given 
executive function, other brain areas are also involved. 
17 Kaplan and Saccuzzo (1997) provide a detailed overview of the different types of applications 
of psychological testing. 
18 See Roberts et al. 2005b for a more complete history of intelligence testing. 
19 In 1904, La Société Libre pour l’Etude Psychologique de l’Enfant appointed a commission to 
create a mechanism for identifying these pupils in need of alternative education led by Binet. See 
Siegler (1992) for an overview of Binet’s life and work. 
20 See Herrnstein and Murray (1994) for a discussion of the Raven test. 
21 See Figure 1 in Web Appendix A for an example item.   
22 See John and Srivastava (1999) for an historical overview of the development of the Big Five.  
See Costa and McCrae (1992a) and Digman (1990) for a review of the emergence of this 
concept. 
23 http://ipip.ori.org, Goldberg et al. 2006. 
24 See, for example, Carroll (1993). 
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25 See Goldsmith et al. (1987) for a discussion of varying perspectives on temperament, 
including a summary of points where major theorists converge. 
26 Indeed, some psychologists use the term “temperament” to indicate all aspects of personality 
that are biological in origin. They study temperament in both children and adults. 
27 Measuring temperament presents unique methodological challenges. Self-report measures, by 
far the most widely used measure for adult personality, are not appropriate for young children for 
obvious reasons. One strategy is to ask parents and teachers to rate the child’s overt behavior (for 
example, California Child Q-sort), but informants can only guess what a child might be thinking 
and feeling. Infants present a special challenge because their behavioral repertoire is so limited. 
One strategy is to place infants in a standard situation and code reactions under a standardized 
scenario (for example, the Strange Situation, which is used to distinguish infants who are 
securely attached to their caregiver versus insecurely attached). Young children can be 
interviewed using puppets or stories. For obvious reasons, all measures of temperament are more 
difficult and more expensive to collect than adult self-report measures. This may explain their 
absence in large-sample studies. 
28 See, for example, the studies summarized in Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001), the original 
analyses presented in that paper, and Mueller and Plug (2006). 
29 More rarely, the multitrait-multimethod matrix approach developed by Campbell and Fiske 
(1959) is used for this purpose. 
30 Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen show how to allow Qi to depend on fi and still identify the 
model.  We discuss this work in the web appendix to this paper. 
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31 Indeed, as documented in Cunha and Heckman (2007a), the factors associated with 
personality are also correlated with the cognitive factors. 
32 Cronbach’s  is a widely used measure of intercorrelation among test scores, that is, a measure 
of importance of the variance of the ,
n
i lε  uniquenesses relative to the variance of the factors.  See 
Lord and Novick (1968) for a precise definition.  
33 See http://www.hoganassessments.com/products_services/hpi.aspx and also Hogan, Hogan, 
and Roberts (1996). 
34 See also the notes on ability bias posted at the website for this paper in Web Appendix C. 
35 See, for example, Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b). 
36 Hogan and Hogan (2007) use a version of this procedure.  In this regard, they appear to be an 
exception among personality psychologists.  However, in psychometrics, there is a long tradition 
of doing predictive analysis based on factor analysis (see, for example, the essays in Cudeck and 
MacCallum 2007), but there is no treatment of the problem of reverse causality as analyzed by 
Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004). 
37 For example, Cragg and Donald (1997) present classical statistical methods for determining 
the number of factors.  In addition to their techniques, there are methods based on Bayesian 
posterior odds ratios. 
38  See Ones and Viswesvaran (1998); Viswesvaran and Ones (1999). 
39 The problem of the transportability of the measurement of a trait in one environment to 
another is a manifestation of the problem of “external validity” that has long been discussed in 
the literature on policy evaluation starting with the early work of Haavelmo (1944) and 
Marschak (1953). Heckman (2005), and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a) are recent discussions of 
 
152 
 
this recurring issue.  Levitt and List (2007a,b) consider the issue of external validity in the 
context of lab experiments in economics.  The solution to the problem of external validity entails 
the construction of formal models for extrapolation and interpretation.  Equation (5) is one such 
model.  If a different model is required for each situation (so lh  becomes 
n
lh ), the problem 
becomes hopelessly complicated and no situation-independent definition of a true latent trait is 
possible. 
40 It is likely that performance on personality tests also depends on cognitive ability, but that is 
less well documented.  For example, it is likely that more intelligent people can ascertain the 
rewards to performance on a personality inventory test.  Motivation is sometimes, but not 
usually, counted as a personality trait. 
41 See Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) for an analysis of the causal effects of schooling 
on achievement tests.  Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) consider the causal effects of 
schooling on measures of personality skills. 
42 The studies in Table 2 do not include direct measures of personality traits. 
43 An ERP is an electrophysiological response of characteristic form and timing to a particular 
category of stimuli. 
44 Jensen (1980), chapter 12, focuses on racial differentials in response to rewards rather than 
absolute levels of incentive effects.  The evidence he reports is consistent with our analysis of 
Table 2. He also discusses the literature up to 1980 on the role of personality in shaping IQ.  Our 
analysis reviews many studies not available to him. 
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45 In economics, Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004), Heckman, Urzua, and Stixrud (2006), 
and Urzua (2007) perform such adjustments and account for the reciprocal interactions discussed 
by the psychologists. 
46 See Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002); Besharov and Coffey (2003); Benhabib, Bisin, and 
Schotter (2004) and Harrison and Lau (2005). Dynamic complementarity, market environments 
and information arrival can rationalize the evidence on hyperbolic discounting. 
47 Heckman (1976) from lifecycle human capital decisions, Hausman (1979) from air 
conditioner demand, Ruderman, Levine, and McMahon (1987) from gas water heaters, freezers 
and Gately (1980) from refrigerator demand. 
48 Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) investigate the link between body mass index (BMI) and 
proxies for the discount rate. 
49 See, for example, Harrison and List (2004) and List (2004, 2006, 2007). 
50 Van Praag (1985) estimates time-discount weights varying by year by linking psychological 
measures about the valuation of income to income patterns. 
51 Using questionnaires, Borghans and Golsteyn (2007) show that the ability to imagine the 
future affects the discount rate. 
52 Numeracy refers to the capability of translating preferences into an annual interest rate. 
53 Heckman (1976) shows that more educated people have lower discount rates.  More able 
people are more likely to attend more years of school. 
54 Further support for this disassociation comes from a cross-cultural study by Du, Green, and 
Meyerson (2002), in which Chinese graduate students discounted delayed rewards much more 
steeply than Japanese students, but Japanese students discounted probabilistic rewards more 
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steeply than did the Chinese.  Barsky et al. (1997) report that their estimates of time preference 
and risk tolerance are independent. 
55 The two cognitive ability tests used by Dohmen et al. (2007) tests were a coding speed and 
vocabulary test. 
56 Dreber and Hoffman (2007) suggest that the gender difference in risk aversion can be partly 
explained by exposure to prenatal hormones, suggesting that risk preference is not fully 
environmentally determined. 
57 See Zuckerman (1994). 
58 Zuckerman (2007) suggests that sensation seeking is related more closely to Big Five 
conscientiousness (inversely), but there is obvious conceptual overlap with excitement seeking, a 
facet of Big Five extraversion on the NEO-PI-R questionnaire, as well as with Big Five openness 
to experience. 
59 Heckman (1974) is an early effort that estimates the population distribution of indifference 
curves between goods and leisure.   
60 Euwals and van Soest (1999) uses the distinction between desired vs. actual hours worked to 
measure the preference for leisure.  Of course, this could be due to constraints in the labor 
market. 
61 “Restriction on range” (see Lord and Novick 1968) is truncation on the variable being 
studied.  In a model with normal random variables, such restriction reduces the correlation. Lack 
of reliability refers to the presence of error variance in the total variance of any given measure. 
The degree to which corrections due to these statistical artifacts are justified is a matter of 
debate. 
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62 See the additional discussion in Web Appendix D. 
63 Interestingly, openness to experience predicts how long an individual stays in school (r = .34) 
better than the grades they earn while in school (r = .05). Similarly, Wong and Csikszentmihalyi 
(1991) find that an orientation toward work and long-term goals predicts higher grades, whereas 
enjoyment while studying is a better predictor of the difficulty level of courses selected by 
students.  
64 Evidence is mixed regarding the effects of IQ on long-term (versus initial) performance. Goff 
and Ackerman (1992) have suggested that insofar as IQ measures maximal performance, 
personality measures, which assess “typical performance,” might be better predictors over the 
long-term. Humphreys and Taber (1973) and Lin and Humphreys (1977) present indirect 
empirical support for this hypothesis: their postdictive and predictive studies suggest that IQ is a 
superior predictor of first-year grades in college and graduate school than of grades in 
subsequent years. Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham (2005) suggested that a decline in the 
predictive validity of IQ may have as its counterpart an increase in the predictive validity of 
personality. Against this, Willingham (1985) has argued that the decline in the predictive validity 
of IQ as students progress through the education system is due entirely to a degradation of the 
validity of grades and increasing restriction on range.  Moreover, Schmidt and Hunter (2004) 
find that g is as robust a predictor of performance among experienced workers as among new 
hires.  
65 There is wider evidence that personality traits are associated with investment behaviour. 
Colquitt, LePine, and Noe (2000) performed a meta-analysis of 256 studies to determine the 
psychological characteristics that are related to training motivation. Internal locus of control, 
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achievement motivation, conscientiousness, self-efficacy have a moderate (r between .3 and .5) 
positive relationship with training motivation, defined specifically as the direction, intensity, and 
persistence of learning-directed behavior in training contexts. In contrast, anxiety has a strong 
negative relationship (r = -.6) with motivation to learn. Whereas IQ is a better predictor of 
academic outcomes, Big Five conscientiousness is a slightly better predictor longevity and 
leadership. To the extent that these post-schooling outcomes are as important, from a subjective 
and societal point of view, one can make the case that personality skills are even more important 
than cognitive skills (see McClelland 1973). 
66 There is also conceptual overlap with the confidence facet of Big Five conscientiousness as 
conceptualized in the NEO-PI-R questionnaire. 
67 It would be useful to investigate whether their “core evaluation” is the same as the 
“personality factor” identified by Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), Urzua (2007), and Cunha 
and Heckman (2007a) that is predictive of many adult behaviors, including wages, employment, 
job turnover, and accumulated work experience. 
68 Squared effect sizes cumulate to total proportion of variance explained only if the predictor 
variables are uncorrelated (Goldberger 1968). 
69 Under a normality assumption, their measure and effect size can be mapped into each other.  
The more general measures do not require normality. 
70 Some psychological studies correct for normal measurement error.  The econometric studies 
account for non-normal measurement errors.  See Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2007). 
71 Environments and investments have an immediate, short-term impact on behavior. Most 
individuals will exert more effort if they are compensated to do so, will be more sociable if there 
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are incentives to do so, and so on.  Thus, the same person may display very different behaviors in 
different settings. The influence of situational factors on behavior is recognized but not 
controlled for or measured. In psychology, the concept of a standardized incentive environment 
remains to be developed or applied.  Equation (5) and (6) is a framework for discussing and 
developing standardized measures. 
72 Normative refers to what most people or the average person experiences. If most people 
deliberately do something that causes change, it would be normative. But that seems unlikely. 
Therefore, most deliberative change is non-normative, but this is not logically necessarily true. 
73 Cross-sectional estimates of mean-level change are biased by cohort effects (for example, the 
Flynn effect) whereas longitudinal estimates are biased by test-retest learning (when the same IQ 
tests are administered repeatedly to the same subjects) and by selective attrition. Thus, both 
estimates must be considered in conjunction as evidence for mean-level change. 
74 Plomin and the essays in the December issue of Monographs for the Society for Research in 
Child Development (2007) extend this analysis to childhood. 
75 We note here that while genes remain constant through the lifecourse, the expression of genes 
is determined, in part, by experience. 
76 Devlin, Daniels, and Roeder (1997) suggest that traditional estimates of the heritability of IQ 
may be inflated because they fail to take into account the effect of the environment of the 
maternal womb.  See also Rutter (2006) and an emerging literature on epigenetics. 
77 Lykken (2007) suggests that heritability estimates for personality are substantially higher 
when situational influence and measurement error are minimized by giving multiple measures at 
least a few months apart.  
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78 Gene-environment interactions are another means by which genes and environment jointly 
influence traits.  The effects of the environment depends on the genes and vice versa (see Caspi 
et al. 2003; Moffitt, Caspi, and Rutter 2005; and Caspi et al. 2002). 
79 A second crucial assumption is that environmental influence can be amplified by a “social 
multiplier” effect: smarter individuals create for one another an enriched environment, which in 
turn increases intelligence, and so on.  Some caution must be taken with this literature.  Blair et 
al (2005) attribute the Flynn effect to increasing access to formal schooling early in the twentieth 
century and, from the mid-century onward, to increasing fluid cognitive demand of mathematics 
curricula.  Flynn (2007) concurs about the former but believes that the latter had negligible 
impact.  
80 The literature establishes that shared environments become less important as children age.  
This literature does not say that environments do not matter. This can arise because genetically 
similar children (or their parents) choose different environments to distinguish themselves or 
because of parental investment (Lizzeri and Siniscalchi 2006). 
81 We note that there is controversy in the literature about the validity of conventional estimates 
of heritability.  It centers on the linearity and additivity assumptions, the assumed absence of 
interactions between genes and environment, and the assumption that genes do not select 
environments.  
82 See also Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) for estimates of the causal effect of schooling 
on AFQT. 
83 However, the data are also consistent with alternative explanations such as extreme stress 
permanently damaging brain structures. 
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84 See Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2007). 
85 This is represented by cross effects of ,i tf  on , 1i tf +  in equation (7). 
86 Some evidence that further intervention can produce enduring change in non-clinical 
populations comes from Gillham and Reivich (1999) who show that children taught to make 
more optimistic causal attributions about negative events maintain this optimistic outlook two 
years post-intervention. 
87 See Ericsson and Ward (2007) for a recent review of the evidence. 
88 See Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) for a good introduction to behavioral economics and 
the papers in Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004). Fudenberg (2006) presents a critical 
review of the literature. 
89 Thurstone (1927), Block and Marschak (1960), Marschak (1960), Becker (1962), Bock and 
Jones (1968), McFadden (1974, 1981), and Falmagne (1985) develop models that recognized 
that constraints (choice sets) may largely determine behavior.  Becker’s random consumer model 
and Sanderson’s (1974) extension of it are the most radical versions of this approach. List (2004) 
is a recent application of this model. 
90 The “taste” shock may be interpreted as either a utility (preference) or as a random element 
that determines which bundle of Bi is selected by agent i. 
91 Allowing personality traits to determine, or screen out certain elements of possible choice sets 
is reminiscent of Tversky’s elimination by aspects (EBA) model (see Tversky 1972a,b).  
McFadden (1981) discusses this model and its relationship to other random utility choice models.  
In our setup, psychological constraints eliminate certain components of choice. 
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92 Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002, review the classical literature in economics 
relating time preference to a failure of imagination. 
93 The model of equation (7) is consistent with the axioms of stochastic revealed preference.  
See McFadden (1981) for one statement of the axioms of stochastic revealed preference. 
94 But see McAdams (2006) and McAdams and Pals (2006). 
95 See Sattinger (1993) for a discussion of hedonic models of earnings.  This specification 
subsumes the conventional labor-leisure model as a special case where eJ+1 is time allocated to 
market and ZJ+1=weJ+1, where w is the wage rate which may be person specific. 
96 Michael (1973) analyzes a scalar environmental variable (education) that plays the role of 
public goods in our analysis.  The environmental variable is not chosen but affects the 
productivity of the other inputs. 
97 One specification of the task functions writes, in the case of scalar e, ( )j j
j jT h f e= so that the 
task depends on the product of jf and je .  In the case of public goods for traits ( )jf f= , the 
level of energy applied to a task augments or reduces the output of the traits.  Thus, if 0je = , the 
trait is effectively not allocated to the task.  For example, agreeable people could decide not to be 
agreeable in certain situations.  Borghans, Ter Weel, and Weinberg (2007) argue that suppressing 
certain psychological traits is harder for some people than others.  In our framework, the utility 
cost of ej is higher for such persons. 
98 Baumeister has recently proposed that the trait of self-control be conceived of as a limited 
resource, the finite capacity of which varies from individual to individual.  Self-control entails 
overriding lower-level processes (for example, impulses and emotions) by higher-level processes 
(that is, processes that are mediated by frontal areas and therefore are classified as executive 
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functions). All brain functions rely on glucose and are metabolically expensive, but higher-level 
processes are particularly impaired by decreases in available glucose. (See Baumeister et al., 
1998; Gailliot et al., 2007). Their analysis corresponds to a public goods case with glucose as a 
component of e, with f a public good and with f  differing among people. 
99 In both cases, as emphasized by Pollak and Wachter (1975), non-constant returns to scale 
produce additional substitution effects.  Our public goods case captures one aspect of their 
analysis of jointness in production. 
100 Thus an angry person may transfer his or her anger to the home sector and thus avoid the 
costs of overriding his or her anger on the job.  Alternatively, in a public goods case, the person 
would allocate more effort to controlling anger on the job than in controlling it at home. 
101 That is, increasing in its arguments and twice differentiable.  Henderson and Quandt (1958) 
formulate such a general model. 
102 We note, however, that the evidence on differences in discount rates across goods is 
sensitive to the role of markets in intertemporal arbitrage.  In the absence of transaction costs, 
market and personal rates of time preference must be in agreement. 
103 See Samuelson (1937) and Strotz (1955). 
104 We consider uncertainty below.   
105 See Johnsen and Donaldson (1985).  The model of Becker and Murphy (1988) is an example 
of a non-separable model that is time consistent. 
106 See the evidence on age dependent preferences in Browning and Meghir (1991) and the 
survey of the evidence presented in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). 
107 Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) and Durlauf and Young (2001) survey this literature. 
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108 See the survey in Starmer (2000). 
109 See Hansen (2007) and the references contained therein. 
110 There is some confusion in the literature about the role of additive separability in models of 
dynamic consistency of decision making under uncertainty.  Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) 
establish that dynamic consistency requires weak separability of intertemporal preferences but 
not the strong separability used in standard models of consumer decision making.  Consider a 
two period model of agent decision making.  X is current consumption.  Ys is future consumption 
in state s, which occurs with Ps.  Under a certain interest rate r, the standard expected utility 
theory postulates that agents maximize for a three-possible-outcome-second-period-model, 
1 1 2 2 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )U X PU Y PU Y PU Y+ + +  
subject to
3
1 1
s
s
s
PA X Y
r=
= + +∑ .  This produces time consistent preferences for the usual reasons.  
However, keeping probabilities implicit, the following non-expected model of utility 
maximization 
11 1 1
32 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3( , , , ) [ log( ) ( ) ( )]U X Y Y Y X X Y X Y XY= + + +  
also produces time consistent preferences.  Note that in this specification even if P1=P2=P3, 
discount rates differ for different second period goods. 
111 See Epstein and LeBreton (1993), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), Siniscalchi (2006), and 
Hansen and Sargent (2008) for analyses of decision making under ambiguity.  Ellsberg (1961) is 
the classic reference. 
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112 Borghans, ter Weel, and Weinberg (2007) provide evidence of assignment based on “people 
skills” in the labor market using British and German data.  Krueger and Schkade (2007) provide 
similar evidence for gregarious workers in the United States. 
113 There is a subliterature in psychology on “g” that pits “g” against personality characteristics 
in terms of their predictive power (see Gottfredson, 2002).  This literature creates a false 
dichotomy. While “g” is predictive in a much wider variety of settings, in particular settings, as 
noted in section V, certain personality traits are more predictive than “g”. 
114 We preserve the distinction made in equation (3) that latent traits ( )tf  and manifest traits 
( )tC  may differ.   We can equate tC  with the ,
k
j tM  in the discussion surrounding equation (3). 
115 See a review of the emerging field of neuroeconomics by Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec 
(2005). On the biological basis of personality, see Canli (2006). 
